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Stanford Technology Law Review
Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers:
A Guide for the Perplexed
OWEN D. JONES, JOSHUA W. BUCKHOLTZ, JEFFREY D. SCHALL, RENE MAROIS1
CITE AS: 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/jones-brain-imaging.pdf
INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

It has become increasingly common for brain images to be proffered as evidence in civil and
criminal litigation.2 This Article offers some general guidelines to legal thinkers about how to
understand brain imaging studies—or at least avoid misunderstanding them. And it annotates a
published brain imaging study by several of the present authors (and others) in order to illustrate and
explain, with step-by-step commentary.3
Brain images are offered in legal proceedings for a variety of purposes, as Professors Carter
Snead and Gary Marchant have usefully surveyed.4 On the civil side, neuroimaging has been offered
in constitutional, personal injury, disability benefit, and contract cases, among others. For example, in
Entertainment Software Ass’n. v. Blagojevich,5 the court considered whether a brain imaging study could
be used to show that exposure to violent video games increases aggressive thinking and behavior in
1 Owen D. Jones is Professor of Law and Professor of Biological Sciences at Vanderbilt University. Joshua W. Buckholtz is a
neuroscience graduate student at Vanderbilt University. Jeffrey D. Schall is E. Bronson Ingram Professor of Neuroscience at
Vanderbilt University. Rene Marois is Associate Professor of Psychology at Vanderbilt University. Jones, Schall, and Marois are
members of the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project, of which Jones also serves as Co-Director. The first two
authors contributed equally to this Article. Correspondence to: owen.jones@vanderbilt.edu or rene.marois@vanderbilt.edu. This
Article was prepared for the Stanford Technology Law Review 2009 Symposium on Neuroscience and the Courts: The Implications of
Advances in Neurotechnology.
We received helpful comments from Gary Marchant and Teneille Brown, as well as from participants at conferences of the
MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project, the 2008 and 2009 Conferences on Empirical Legal Studies, and the
Arizona State University College of Law conference “Law and Ethics of Brain Scanning: The Next Big Thing Coming Soon to a
Courthouse Near You?” Bailey Spaulding and Francis Shen provided valuable research assistance.
Preparation of this Article was supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Regents of the
University of California, and Vanderbilt University.
2 For an overview of issues, see Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007, at 49; Stacey A.
Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2007). A sampling of
the rapidly-growing scholarship at the law/neuroscience intersection appears infra note 32.
3 The full complement of authors is: Joshua W. Buckholtz, Christopher L. Asplund, Paul E. Dux, David Zald, John C. Gore,
Owen D. Jones, and Rene Marois. The article was published as The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment, 60 NEURON 930
(2008).
4 A very useful survey, on which we draw in part in the paragraphs that follow, has been prepared by Professor Carter Snead.
See CARTER SNEAD, NEUROIMAGING AND THE COURTS: STANDARD AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASE INDEX, (2006),
http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/stl/June06/Snead.doc . Our research also benefitted from Gary Marchant, Brain Scanning
and the Courts: Criminal Cases, Presentation to the Research Network on Legal Decision Making, MacArthur Foundation Law and
Neuroscience Project (Oct. 11, 2008).
5 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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¶4

¶5

¶6

¶7

adolescents. In Fini v. General Motors Corp,6 brain scans were proffered to help determine the extent of
head injuries from a car accident. In Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Retirement Plan,7 a former
professional football player proffered brain scans in an effort to prove entitlement to neurodegenerative disability benefits. And in Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Trust Co.8, involving a
dispute over the sale of land, the defendant introduced brain images to prove mental incompetency,
resulting in a voidable contract.
In criminal cases, brain images are sometimes invoked to support an argument that a defendant
is incompetent to stand trial. In United States v. Kasim, for example, Kasim was found to be demented,
and incompetent to stand trial for Medicaid fraud, on the basis of medical testimony that included
brain images.9 Brain images are also increasingly proffered by the defense at the guilt-determination
phase, in an effort to negate the mens rea element of a crime, and to thereby avoid conviction. For
example, in People v. Weinstein, 10 a defendant accused of strangling his wife and throwing her from a
twelfth floor window sought to introduce images of a brain defect, in support of an argument that he
was not responsible for his act. And in People v. Goldstein,11 a defendant sought to introduce a brain
image of an abnormality, in an effort to prove an insanity defense, after he pushed a woman in front
of a subway train, killing her.
Brain images have also been proffered at the sentencing phase of criminal cases, in furtherance
of mitigation. For example, in Oregon v. Kinkel,12 a boy convicted of killing and injuring fellow
students in a high school cafeteria sought to introduce brain images of abnormalities, in an effort to
secure a more lenient sentence. Brain images have been offered—in Coe v. State,13 for example—to
argue that a convicted murderer is not competent to be executed. And accessibility to brain imaging
technology has even been litigated—in Ferrell v. State14 and People v. Morgan15 for instance—in the
context of a claim that a defense counsel’s failure to procure a brain image for the defendant
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
For better or worse, the full complement of cases at the intersection of neuroscience and law is
now too large for comprehensive overview—in part because many of the cases do not result in
reported decisions.16 While there is no denying that brain imaging is a powerful tool, whether used
for medical or legal purposes, it is also clear that, like any tool, brain imaging can be used for good or
for ill, skillfully or sloppily, and in ways useful or irrelevant.
We are concerned that brain imaging can be misused by lawyers (intentionally or unintentionally)
and misunderstood by judges and jurors. Consequently, our aim in this Article is to provide
information about the operation and interpretation of brain imaging techniques, in hopes that it will
increase the extent to which imaging is properly interpreted, and conversely decrease the extent to
which it is misunderstood or misused. We provide this information across two Parts and one
Appendix.
Part I of the Article provides some very brief background on modern brain imaging, with
particular emphasis on one wide-spread and powerful technique, known as functional magnetic
No. 227592, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 884 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 8 2003).
410 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005).
8 No. 215512, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2369 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 2000).
9 United States v. Kasim, No. 2:07 CR 56, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89137 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 3, 2008). See also McMurtey v. Ryan,
539 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
10 591 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
11 786 N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), overruled on other grounds, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 843 N.E.2d 727, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389
(2005).
12 56 P.3d 463 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
13 17 S.W.3d 193 (Tenn. 2000).
14 918 So.2d 163 (Fla. 2005).
15 719 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1999).
16 One of the many efforts under way, within the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project, is a study by Hank
Greely and Teneille Brown to find all actual and attempted uses of neuroimaging in criminal cases in California after January 1,
2006, regardless of whether such uses are mentioned in published opinions.
6
7
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¶11

resonance imaging (fMRI). The physics of fMRI, and the statistics accompanying the analyses that
generate brain images, are complicated. We will make no effort to provide a comprehensive or
detailed exploration of the subject. There are many existing textbooks that cover this material to
great depths, often far greater than legal thinkers will need to master, for the specific contexts in
which brain images are (potentially) legally relevant.17
Instead, we will aim here to focus on what a lawyer needs to know, in order to have a basic
understanding of what works how and why. Our goal is to present this in an accessible way,
recognizing (as we trust our readers to allow us) that simplifying discussions are illustrative of general
principles, but obviously ignore the richer detail that enables deeper appreciation of important
caveats and subtleties.
Part II of this Article then turns to provide, in brief and accessible overview, a variety of key
concepts to understand about the legal, biological, and brain imaging contexts at this particular
law/neuroscience intersection, as well as a variety of guidelines we (and in some cases others)
recommend to help avoid the various factual errors, logical traps, and analytic mis-steps that can all
too quickly lead away from sound and sensible understandings of what brain images can mean—and
equally what they cannot. Make no mistake: we are not the only researchers concerned about
potential misunderstandings of brain images.18 A great many cautions have been swirling about in the
literature, often offering multiple versions of key and basic points about the limitations of the
technologies, and we hope here to distill some of those, add others, and explain the set in a way that
we hope provides a concise and useful introduction to legal thinkers approaching this
interdisciplinary nexus for the first time.
The Appendix to this Article then provides a concrete illustration of how to read an fMRI study.
We will not over-claim. Some of the details of fMRI defy short descriptions, involve technical details
unlikely to be relevant in legal contexts, or both. On the other hand, much of the technical jargon,
and many of the basic concepts one will encounter in an fMRI study, are clear with just a little
explanation, oriented toward the audience we anticipate. We attempt to provide this in an accessible,
informative way—assuming no particular scientific sophistication of the reader.
Specifically, the core of the Appendix is a 2008 fMRI study (co-authored by three of us and
others) that used fMRI techniques to investigate how brains are activated during punishment
decisions. Though we do not anticipate that the substantive findings will necessarily find immediate
utility in litigation, we believe that legal thinkers reading an fMRI study will learn most from a study
17 See, e.g., SCOTT A. HUETTEL ET AL., FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (2d ed. 2009); ALFRED L.
HOROWITZ, MRI PHYSICS FOR RADIOLOGISTS: A VISUAL APPROACH (3d ed. 1995); FUNCTIONAL MRI: AN INTRODUCTION TO
METHODS (Peter Jezzard et al., 2001). Useful introductions to broader cognitive neuroscience, of which brain-imaging is but a
part, appear in: MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND (3d ed. 2008);
JAMIE WARD, THE STUDENT’S GUIDE TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE (2006); ESSENTIALS OF NEURAL SCIENCE AND
BEHAVIOR (Eric R. Kandel et al. eds., 1995); MARIE T. BANICH, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGY (2d ed.
2004); MARK F. BEAR ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE: EXPLORING THE BRAIN (3d ed. 2006); NEUROSCIENCE (Dale Purves et al. eds.,
4th ed. 2007).
18 The limits of brain imaging techniques are widely known to brain imaging researchers, and many brain imaging researchers
are broadly concerned about misunderstandings among laypeople. A non-exhaustive list of important cautionary and explanatory
articles, which have influenced some of our approaches below, include: John T. Cacioppo et al., Just Because You’re Imaging the Brain
Doesn’t Mean You Can Stop Using Your Head: A Primer and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 650 (2003);
Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007); Eric Racine et al., fMRI in the Public Eye, 6
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 159 (2005); J.D. Trout, Seduction Without Cause: Uncovering Explanatory Neurophilia, 12 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 281 (2008); Society of Nuclear Medicine Brain Imaging Council, Ethical Clinical Practice of Functional Brain Imaging,
37 J. NUCLEAR MED. 1256 (1996); Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON 412 (2008); Joseph H. Baskin et al.,
Is A Picture Worth A Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239 (2007); Russell A. Poldrack et al.,
Guidelines for Reporting an fMRI Study, 40 NEUROIMAGE 409 (2008); Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do
With fMRI, 453 NATURE 869, (2008); WILLIAM R. UTTAL, NEUROSCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM: WHAT EVERY LAWYER
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE MIND AND THE BRAIN (2008). One of the works most critical of how brain imaging results can be
interpreted is WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN
(2003).
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that inherently addressed matters relevant to law—in this case, the decision whether or not to punish
someone for criminal behavior and, if so, how much.
To facilitate that learning in this concrete application, the Stanford Technology Law Review has
generously afforded us the unique opportunity to annotate the Article in the margin with
explanations of various terms and contexts, as they appear throughout the study.
I. BRAIN-IMAGING: A VERY BRIEF OVERVIEW

¶13

¶14

¶15

¶16

¶17

There are many kinds of brain images. All readers are likely familiar with the way x-rays, and the
closely aligned technique known as computed tomography (CT) scanning, can show various
structural anomalies in the body, including in the brain. In these techniques, radiation aimed at and
passing through the body forms images on photographic film. The varying density of different
tissues in the body results in varying levels of radiation reaching the film—creating, in turn, an image
of internal structures. (For example, bone tissue appears as white, while soft tissue appears gray.) CT
scanning varies from conventional x-rays by virtue of collecting images from multiple angles rotating
around the body, which images are then combined by computers into cross-sectional representations.
These techniques (like magnetic resonance imaging, which will be discussed in a moment) are used
for information about how various parts of the body are structured. They can show whether
structures are intact, and can reveal damage, atrophy, intrusions, and developmental anomalies. They
do not, however, collect or provide information about how those body parts are actually functioning.
PET scanning, which refers to positron emission tomography, is one of the techniques that enable
researchers to learn about how the brain functions, as it is actually doing so. With PET, a researcher
injects a subject with radioactive tracers that move through the bloodstream and accumulate in
different locations and concentrations in the brain, over time, as different parts of the brain increase
and decrease activity (such as glucose metabolism) that is associated with brain function. (A similar
technique, known as SPECT, uses single photon emission computed tomography.)
EEG and MEG, short for electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography respectively,
records electromagnetic fluctuations in various parts of the brain, as the brain is functioning, using
non-invasive sensors applied to the scalp.19 In research laboratories, the EEG signals can be analyzed
in relation to stimuli or responses to obtain event-related potentials (ERP) which were used before brain
imaging was developed to make inferences about the brain processes underlying perceptual, cognitive
and motor processes.20
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging21) uses the technology of regular magnetic
resonance imaging adapted to detect changes in hemodynamic (literally “blood movement”)
properties of the brain occurring when the subject is engaged in very specific mental tasks. In a
nutshell (and with a reminder that we are over-simplifying for heuristic purposes) here’s how it
works.
At its most basic, fMRI can be understood as a tool for learning which regions of the brain are
working, how much, and for how long, during particular tasks. In much the same way that the body
delivers more oxygen to muscles that are working harder, the body delivers more oxygen to brain
regions that work harder. The fMRI technique measures blood oxygenation levels—within small
cubic volumes of brain tissue known as “voxels”—as those levels change across time with the

19 This signal is used in conjunction with measures like heart-rate and skin electrical conductance to constitute the polygraph
procedure that is used commonly in a context of detecting deception. Although used commonly by the U.S. government and
police departments, the fundamental limitations of these procedures have been thoroughly described. See, e.g., COMM. TO REVIEW
THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003)
20 STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL TECHNIQUE (2005). Some have attempted
to use ERP signals in legal settings, but the limitations of this approach are well-known and can serve as lessons for the
interpretation of brain imaging information.
21 The leading “f” remains lower-case, by convention.
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varying metabolic demands of active neurons.22 Changes in demand for oxygen are widely considered
to be reliable proxies for inferring the fluctuating activity of the underlying neural tissue.23
The physical principles underlying fMRI are quite complex. But in general terms the technology
works as follows: An fMRI machine creates and manipulates a primary magnetic field,24 as well as
several smaller magnetic fields (one in each three-dimensional plane) that can be quickly varied in
orientation and uniformity. Recall (from basic physics) that protons within the nuclei of atoms spin
on an axis and carry a positive charge. As they spin, these electric charges form what can be thought
of as tiny magnets. When a person is inserted (typically horizontally) into the open bore of an fMRI
machine, the previously random axes of spin, for many protons, align, like iron filings along a
magnet. That is, the axes begin to point in the same direction. Researchers then administer to the
subject’s head brief radio frequency pulses (which usually originate from a device looking rather like a
small bird-cage that surrounds the subject’s head). Those pulses deflect the protons’ axes of spin
temporarily. When the pulses stop, the axes gradually return to their original orientation, releasing
energy during that “relaxation” process. The machine can detect characteristics of the released energy
because it depends on a proton’s “local” magnetic environment, and this environment is affected by
the relative concentrations of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood in local brain tissue. Crucially, as
these concentrations are affected by regional changes in brain activity, they provide indirect markers
of neural activity that form the basis of the fMRI signal. The machine enables localization of these
signals in space—i.e. “spatial resolution”—by collecting them from many different “slices” of the
brain. And the technique enables localization of these signals in time—i.e., “temporal resolution”—
by recording the signals many times over a period of several seconds for each mental event. A
“stack” of slices comprising the whole brain is acquired every couple of seconds or so, enabling the
rapid collection of many of these three-dimensional “volumes” of brain activity over the period of an
experimental paradigm.
II. KEY CONCEPTS AND GUIDELINES

¶19

This Part is divided into four sections. These address the legal context, the biological context, the
intersection of law and biology, and finally, with that preparatory background, the brain imaging
context. We proceed in this way because one cannot gain a clear understanding of brain imaging, and
its intersection with the legal system, without first considering the underlying legal and biological
contexts, and their background interactions.
A. The Legal Context

¶20
¶21

¶22

With terrific, new, whiz-bang technology—which can reveal inner structures and workings of the
brain—it is all too tempting to jump past the more mundane legal issues, and to race to apply new
techniques to solve new problems in new ways.
But hold the horses. Although our principal purpose here is to discuss how to read (and not
read) brain imaging evidence, we would be remiss not to first anchor the discussion in the legal
contexts in which those images might, arguably, be admissible. The territory here is broad, and could
occupy us for some time. But to be brief, there are a variety of questions to keep in mind, at the
outset, in order to understand the specific legal context in which brain imaging might be considered
in the courtroom.
The threshold consideration, of course, is: Are the proffered brain images relevant? Because behavior
comes from the brain, and the legal system often cares not only about how someone acted but also
See generally HUETTEL ET AL., supra note 17.
There are varying opinions in the neuroscience community about how conclusive an understanding there is of the fMRI
signal’s relationship to the activity of neurons, and about how much fMRI can reveal—beyond where brain activation occurred—
about behavior and mental states. See, e.g., Logothetis, supra note 18; Poldrack, supra note 18.
24 Magnetic fields are described in Tesla units. A 3-Tesla machine (which uses super-cooled electrical coils) generates a
magnetic field roughly 60,000 times the magnetic field of the Earth.
22
23
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¶24

¶25

¶26

why, it is tempting to assume that brain images of people important to the litigation will provide
legally relevant information, of one sort or another. But this is, in fact, not a decision to reach lightly.
What specific legal questions do the images purportedly address? Contexts vary considerably, even within
the civil and criminal halves of the docket (each of which bears differing underlying standards of
proof). Within civil cases, for example, there are a wide variety of different legal purposes into which
brain images might conceivably plug. Are brain images proffered to help establish liability, such as in
the case of a medical malpractice action? To demonstrate a pre-existing condition, such as in the case
of a dispute over insurance coverage? To help estimate damages, such as in the case of a car
accident? And within criminal cases, are brain images proffered during the liability phase, in an effort
to defeat the prosecution’s claim that the defendant had (and was therefore capable of having) the
mental state requisite for conviction? Are they instead proffered during the sentencing phase, in an
effort to mitigate penalty? Are they proffered as evidence of lying or truthfulness?
It is important to remember that the admissibility of brain images is not simply a matter of
whether they are scientifically sound. The potential relevance and hence admissibility of brain images
will vary, according to the specific legal issue at hand within civil and criminal contexts. Put another way,
the admissibility of brain images depends largely on their perceived potential relevance (if any) to the
issue to be determined, independent of (and often before) considering the quality and interpretation of
the specific images themselves.
What, specifically, do the images allegedly demonstrate, and how well does that connect to the legal issues at hand?
Some of the many variables that may come into play here include: Are these structural or functional
images? When were they taken? (For example, before or after events in question?) How recently?
Under what circumstances were they procured? (For example, what specific mental tasks was the
subject executing during functional imaging?) What is being compared to what? (For example: Are
these before and after images of the same brain?; Are these comparisons between a party’s brain and
a group-averaged composite, for contrast?)
What are the applicable standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence? As is well known, the federal
and state systems can have (and often do have) different standards for the admission of scientific
evidence. And the state standards vary among the states. It is therefore necessary to note that the
backdrop of all that follows below is the specific legal regime under which images are to be evaluated
for potential relevance, within the specific context of the specific matters in dispute. Although it is
not our purpose here to explore the applicability of scientific evidence law to brain images, we would
be remiss not to flag the centrality of evidentiary rules and contexts to all that follows. Interested
readers will find comprehensive discussion of scientific evidence generally in the treatise MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE.25
B. The Biological Context

¶27

Understanding the potential relevance of brain images to law also requires a few words of general
background about the relationship between biology and behavior generally. Key things to keep in
mind (generally speaking) include26:
 All behavior results from the interaction of genes, environments (including social contexts),
developmental history, and the evolutionary processes that built the brain to function in the
ways it does.
 Behavior originates in the physical and chemical activities of the brain.27
25 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF E XPERT TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2006).
Chapter One provides an excellent overview of the “general acceptance” and validity tests. It examines the cases that established
those tests and discusses subsequent cases that applied and further developed those tests.
26 Interested readers can find further information about these background principles in a variety of sources (as well as in the
citations that they, in turn, provide). See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Schall, On Building A Bridge Between Brain And Behavior, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCH.
23 (2004).
27 Yes, the alert reader will point out that some behavior, such as reflexes, leaps right out of the spinal cord. In the text, we
are speaking in generalities.
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All behavior is thus “biological.”
Understanding behavior as biological in nature does not mean that behavior is “biologically
determined” in a reductionist or reliably predictive way.
The brain is an evolved information-processing organ that, generally speaking, and through
differing processes, associates various environmental inputs with various behavioral outputs.
Those environmental influences are (generally speaking) unique for each individual.
Each person’s brain, though highly flexible, is both anatomically and functionally specialized.
(That is, brains do not consist of undifferentiated all-purpose tissue.)
Humans share, across the species, a common brain plan of anatomical and functional
specialization,
Each brain is slightly different in size, shape, and other anatomical features.
One area of the brain can affect multiple behaviors.
A given behavior arises from multiple areas of the brain.
Different individuals can use different parts of the brain, in different ways, on the same
cognitive tasks.
Behavior is a complex phenomenon, neither attributable to single causes, nor easily parsed
among multiple causes.
Cognitive phenomena rarely originate from a single region in the brain.

C. The Intersections of Biology and Law
¶28

The potential relevance of brain imaging to law must be evaluated against the broader
background of the intersections of law and human biology (both structural and behavioral)
generally.28
 Like the rest of behavior, both criminal and law-abiding behavior originates in the brain.
 There is no brain structure, or set of brain structures, that is specifically “for” criminal or
law-abiding behavior (since those categorizations of behavior are socially determined).
 To say that brain features influence behavior relevant to crime does not mean that brain
features can necessarily explain why certain individuals behaved criminally.
 No explanation of any kind, brain-based or otherwise, has an automatic bearing on
justification or exculpation or mitigation in law.
 Legal responsibility for behavior is a legal conclusion, not a scientific finding.
 Establishing a “biological basis” for behavior carries no automatic, normative relevance to
anything (legal or otherwise).
 Norms, though influenced by biology, can never be justified by biology alone.
D. The Brain Imaging Context (using fMRI)

¶29

With that brief but foundational background, drawing attention to the legal and biological
contexts, and the interaction of them, we can now turn to discuss key concepts about brain imaging
that legal thinkers should know29:

28 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). See also LAW
& THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough, eds., 2006); LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oliver Goodenough,
eds., 2009); THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW (Nita Farahany ed., 2009); Owen D. Jones, Behavioral
Genetics and Crime, In Context, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 81 (2006); bibliographic sources compiled on the website of The Society
for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (www.sealsite.org).
29 For more details, see sources cited supra note 17.
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1. Anatomical imaging and functional imaging are importantly different.
¶30

Two anatomical images, taken one minute apart, will ordinarily look identical. Yet two functional
images, from data collected one minute apart, could look completely different. One reason this is so
is simply that, in the latter case, brain activity changes rapidly. Another reason is because fMRI brain
images are built statistically, not recorded photographically. In the typical fMRI case, hundreds of
recordings are made of each voxel in the brain, at slightly different times (e.g., every two seconds).
Each recording of each voxel within a given trial is analogous to a single frame in a movie. Learning
what happens within each voxel, over time, is akin to watching motion seem to emerge from the
observation of successive snapshots that comprise a moving picture. But that metaphor only captures
part of the fMRI technique, because there are subsequently many repeat recordings of that voxel,
under similar conditions, on many consecutive trials—the results of which are typically then averaged
across trials. Complicating matters further is that there are about one hundred thousand voxels
within the brain, and what typically matters is how neural activity within those voxels is varying over
time, in relation to some task the subject(s) undertake while being scanned. Furthermore, within each
voxel are millions of neurons of different types, interacting in ways that could be mechanistically
different but indistinguishable from the measure of fMRI. In the end, fMRI brain images lay the
result of any one of many possible statistical tests overtop of an anatomical image of a selected slice
of the brain. That is, an fMRI image is a composite of an anatomical image, of the researcher’s
choosing, and a statistical representation of the brain activity in that image, also of the researcher’s
choosing.
2. Functional brain imaging is not mind reading.

¶31

There is more to a thought than blood flow and oxygen. fMRI is very good at discovering where
brain tissue is active (commonly by highlighting differences between brain activations during
different cognitive tasks). But differences are not thoughts. fMRI can show differences in brain
activation across locations, across time, and across tasks. But that often does not enable any reliable
conclusion about precisely what a person is thinking.30
3. Scanners don’t create fMRI brain images; people create fMRI brain images.

¶32

Images are only as good as the manner in which the researcher designed the specific task or
experiment, deployed the machine, collected the data, analyzed the results, and generated the images.
It is important to remember that fMRI images are the result of a process about a process. Multiple
choices and multiple steps go into determining exactly what data will be collected, how, and when—
as well as into how the data will be analyzed and how it will be presented.
4. Group-averaged and individual brain images are importantly different.

¶33

Most brain imaging research is directed toward understanding how the average brain, within a
subject population, is activated during different tasks. This is not at all the same thing as saying either
that all brains performing the same task activate in the average way, or saying that the activation of a
single brain can tell us anything meaningful about the operation of the average brain. Consequently:
Do not assume that the scan of any individual is necessarily representative of any group.
Do not assume that the averaged scan of any group will necessarily be representative of any
individual.

30 There appear to be some exceptions. See, e.g., John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17
CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007) (determining through brain imaging, with up to 71% accuracy, which of two tasks a person is
covertly intending to perform); Y. Kamitani & F. Tong, Decoding the Visual and Subjective Contents of the Human Brain, 8 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 679 (2005) (determining through brain imaging, with near 80% accuracy, which of two overlapping visual patterns
a person is paying attention to); S. A. Harrison & F. Tong, Decoding Reveals the Contents of Visual Working Memory in Early Visual
Areas,458 NATURE 632-35 (2009) (determining through brain imaging, with 83-86% accuracy, which of two visual patterns a
person is actively maintaining in memory).
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5. There is no inherent meaning to the color on an fMRI brain image.
¶34

fMRI does not detect colors in the brain. fMRI images use colors—of whatever segment of the
rainbow the researcher prefers—to signify the result of a statistical test. By convention, the brighter the
color (say, yellow compared to orange) the greater the statistical significance of the differences in
brain activity between two conditions. Put another way, the brighter the color, the less likely it is that
the differences in brain activity in that voxel or region, between two different cognitive tasks, was
due to chance alone. As with any color-coded representation, accurate interpretation requires
knowing exactly what each color represents in absolute terms. The researcher specifies what each
color will represent, and this matters. Yellow might mean that there is only one chance in one
thousand that the difference between brain activations in this voxel, between condition, is due to
random chance. Or, yellow might mean that there is one chance in twenty that the difference is due
to random chance.31
6. fMRI brain images do not speak for themselves.

¶35

No fMRI brain image has automatic, self-evident significance. Even well-designed, wellexecuted, properly analyzed, properly generated images must have their import, in context,
interpreted.
7. Classification of an anatomical or behavioral feature of the brain as normal or abnormal is not a simple
thing.

¶36

Because we have learned a great deal about the brain, from dissection, imaging, and the like, we
have some confidence about what a typical brain looks like, and how a typical brain functions. But
even without full anatomical scans of everyone on the planet, we know there is considerable
variation—both anatomically and functionally—within some general parameters. That means that it
can be (with some exceptions, such as a bullet lodged in the brain) difficult to say with precision how
uncommon a given feature or functional pattern may be, even if it appears to be atypical. Base rates
for anatomical or functional conditions are often unknown. For example: suppose brain images show
that a defendant has an abnormal brain feature. We often do not have any idea how many people
with nearly identical abnormalities do not behave as the defendant did. How, then, to make a
reasonable conclusion about the causal effect of the brain condition?
8. Even when an atypical feature of function is identified, understanding the meaning of that is considerably
complex.

¶37

Brain images can show unique features and functions of a person’s brain. But the meaning of
them is rarely self-evident. Determining which of those are important, and how, depends not only on
the legal context for which the images are offered, but also on expert analysis of what the images do
and do not mean. For example, suppose that measurement of the fMRI-detected signal during a
given cognitive task indicates that a person has less neural activity in a given region than does the
average person. Does that mean that the person is somehow cognitively impaired in that region? Or
might it alternatively indicate that the person has more expertise or experience than average,
requiring less cognitive effort?
9. Correlation is (still) not causation.

¶38

The fact that two things vary in parallel tells us little about whether the two are necessarily
causally related and, if so, which causes which. For example, suppose brain imaging reveals that
Consider this quote from a popular account:
With PET, for example, a depressed brain will show up in cold, brain-inactive deep blues, dark purples, and hunter
greens; the same brain when hypomanic however, is lit up like a Christmas tree, with vivid patches of bright reds and
yellows and oranges. Never has the color and structure of science so completely captured the cold inward deadness of
depression or the vibrant, active engagement of mania.
KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND MADNESS 196 (1995). Our point here is that the
colors used are arbitrary, and may have been represented in this way to create precisely this impression.
31
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seventy percent of inmates on death row for homicide have atypical brain activation in a given
region, compared to normal, unincarcerated subjects. That statistic does not mean that the brain
activation pattern causes homicidal behavior. It might mean that having murdered affects brain
activations, or that being incarcerated for long periods of time affects brain activations, or something
else entirely.
10. Today’s brain is not yesterday’s brain.
¶39

In all but the most fanciful of contexts, a brain scan likely takes place long after the behavior
(such as criminal activity) that gives rise to the scan. Drawing causal inferences is therefore further
complicated. People’s brains change with age and experience. And some proportion of the
population will develop atypical anatomical or functional conditions over time. If a defendant is
scanned six months or six years after the act in question, and the scan detects an abnormality, it is
not a simple matter to conclude with confidence that the same abnormality was present at the time in
question or—even if one assumes so, arguendo—that it would have meaningfully affected behavior.
11. Scanners (in theory) detect what they are built, programmed, and instructed to detect, in the way they are
built, programmed, and instructed to detect it.

¶40

Scanners are highly complex and often unique pieces of machinery. So (as in other areas of
science) are the people who calibrate, program, operate, and interpret collected data. It is important
to recognize that the product of these intersecting complexities may or may not be reliable,
generalizable, and replicable.
12. fMRI brain imaging enables inferences about the mind, built on inferences about neural activity, built on
the detection of physiological functions believed to be reliably associated with brain activity.

¶41

¶42

It is important to remember that fMRI does not provide a direct measure of neuronal activity—
as do, for example, invasive techniques that measure single neuron recordings. fMRI detects
fluctuations in oxygen concentrations thought to be reliably associated with neuronal activity. But the
precise relationship between metabolic demands and neuronal function remains poorly understood.
Even if regional activations in brain images reflect true neural activity, it should also be kept in
mind that our ability to confidently infer the cognitive process that must have led to such regional
activation is highly constrained. This is because neuroscientists still understand so little about what
the various regions of the human brain contribute to a particular cognitive function.
CONCLUSION

¶43
¶44
¶45

¶46
¶47

We have provided above a very brief introduction to the intersection of brain imaging and law
(and provide in the Appendix a step-by-step tour of a neurolaw brain-imaging study) principally
intended for those relatively new to this interdisciplinary intersection.
Courts are already frequently confronted with issues concerning the admissibility and proper
interpretation of brain images. And all present indicators suggest that brain images will be proffered
by more lawyers in more cases in more contexts for more purposes in the future.
On one hand, the issues for the legal system are simply the same as they long have been: What
might the proffered evidence tell us that may help us to answer legally identified questions in fair,
effective, and efficient ways? Brain imaging is simply the latest high-tech tool to be offered for its
potential assistance in this age-old enterprise.
On the other hand, brain imaging represents a perfect storm of power, to be used or abused. It
combines the authoritative patina enjoyed by scientific evidence generally, and the allure of allmodern brain science specifically, with the seductive power of visual images.
How the legal system will ultimately deal with the exogenous shock of such technologically,
rhetorically, and visually powerful information remains to be seen. To deal with it well, however, the
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legal system will need the combined efforts and advice of many legal and neuroscientific scholars,32
such as those populating the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project,33 the Gruter
Institute for Law and Behavioral Research,34 and the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law
(SEAL).35 And, fortunately, many efforts are underway. In the meantime, legal thinkers likely to
encounter brain images in their work would be well-advised to lay carefully constructed mental
templates, on which to hang existing and future information emerging from brain-imaging
communities. We hope that what we have discussed here will provide a useful means for doing so.

32 See, e.g., LAW AND THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough, eds., 2006); LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman
& Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009); NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (Brent
Garland ed., 2004); George J. Annas, Foreword: Imagining a New Era of Neuroimaging, Neuroethics, and Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. & MED.
163 (2007); Bruce A. Arrigo, Punishment, Freedom, and the Culture of Control: The Case of Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J. L. & MED.
457 (2007); Abram S. Barth, Note and Comment, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM.
J.L. & MED. 501 (2007); Nita Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L.R. 859 (2009); Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging
and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 233 (2006); Brent Garland & Paul W.
Glimcher, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Law, 16 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 130 (2006); Steven Goldberg, MRIs and the
Perception of Risk, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 229 (2007); Oliver R. Goodenough, Mapping Cortical Areas Associated with Legal Reasoning and
Moral Intuition, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 429 (2001); Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1103 (2008); Henry T. Greely, Remarks on Human Biological Enhancement, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1139 (2008); Henry T.
Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377 (2007); Joshua Greene &
Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004); Charles N. W. Keckler, Cross Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility
Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2006); Laura Stephens Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the Image: An
Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171 (2007); Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and
Ethical Implications of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1623-24 (2006); Adam Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of
Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 (2007); Jennifer J. Kulynych, The Regulation of MR Neuroimaging Research: Disentangling the
Gordian Knot, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 295 (2007); Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A “No-Brainer” or a
Human Rights Hazard?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483 (2007); Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007);
Stephen Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006); Erin Ann
O’Hara, How Neuroscience Might Advance the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1677
(2004); Purvak Patel et al., The Role of Imaging in United States Courtrooms, 17 NEUROIMAGING CLINICS N. AM. 557 (2007); Mark
Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319 (2007); Richard E.
Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51 (2006); Robert
Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL
SCI.1787 (2004); Alexander McCall Smith, Human Action, Neuroscience, and the Law, in THE NEW BRAIN SCIENCES: PERILS AND
PROSPECTS 103 (Dai Rees & Steven Rose eds., 2004); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (2007); Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment,
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359 (2007); Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271 (2007); Erich Taylor, Note, A New Wave of Police Interrogation? “Brain
Fingerprinting,” The Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 287
(2006); Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of Interrogation Jurisprudence?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 341 (2007); Stacey A. Tovino,
Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415 (2007); Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging
Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: A Historical Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193 (2007); Special Issue, International Perspectives
on Brain Imaging and the Law, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1 (2008).
33 The Law & Neuroscience Project, http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
34Gruter Institute, http://www.gruterinstitute.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
35Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law, http://www.sealsite.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
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Appendix:
The Neural Correlates of ThirdParty Punishment
JOSHUA W. BUCKHOLTZ1, 2, CHRISTOPHER L.
ASPLUND1, 2, PAUL E. DUX1, DAVID H. ZALD1,5,
JOHN C. GORE3,5,8,9, OWEN D. JONES,5, 6, 7 AND

RENÉ MAROIS1, 4, 5
SUMMARY
¶1

Legal decision-making in criminal contexts includes two
essential functions performed by “third parties” unaffected by
the crime: assessing responsibility and determining an
appropriate punishment. To explore the neural underpinnings
of these processes, we scanned subjects with fMRI while they
determined the appropriate punishment for crimes that varied
in both perpetrator responsibility and crime severity. Activity
within regions linked to social and affective processing
(amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate
cortex) predicted punishment magnitude for a range of
criminal scenarios. By contrast, activity in right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex strongly distinguished between scenarios on
the basis of criminal responsibility alone, suggesting that it
plays a key role in third-party punishment. Strikingly, the same
prefrontal area has previously been shown to be involved in
punishing unfair economic behavior in two-party interactions,
raising the possibility that the cognitive processes supporting
third-party legal decision-making and second-party economic
norm enforcement may be supported by a common neural
mechanism in human prefrontal cortex.


This Appendix contains an annotated version of the article orginally
published at 60 NEURON 930 (2008).
Department of Psychology1, Neuroscience Graduate Program2, Institute of
Imaging Science3, Vision Research Center4, Center for Integrative and Cognitive
Neurosciences5, Law School6, and Department of Biological Sciences7 and
Departments of Radiology and Radiological Sciences8 and Biomedical
Engineering9 of Vanderbilt University.
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INTRODUCTION
¶2

¶3

¶4

Though rare in the rest of the animal kingdom, large scale
cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals is the rule,
rather than the exception, in Homo sapiens (Henrich, 2003).
Ultra-sociality and cooperation in humans is made possible by
our ability to establish social norms – widely shared sentiments
about appropriate behaviors that foster both social peace and
economic prosperity (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a; Spitzer et
al., 2007). In turn, norm compliance relies not only on the
economic self-interest often served by cooperation and fair
exchange, but also on the credible threat of unwelcome
consequences for defection (Spitzer et al., 2007). Social order
therefore depends on punishment – which modern societies
administer through a system of state-empowered enforcers,
guided by state-governed, impartial, third-party decisionmakers, who are not directly affected by the norm violation
and have no personal stake in the execution of its enforcement.
The role of legal decision-makers is two-fold: determining
responsibility and assigning an appropriate punishment. In
determining responsibility, a legal decision-maker must assess
whether the accused has committed a wrongful act and, if so,
whether he did it with one of several culpable states of mind
(so-called “mens rea”) (Robinson, 2002). For many of the most
recognizable crimes, the defendant must have engaged in the
proscribed conduct with intent in order to merit
punishment. Moreover, in sentencing an individual for whom
criminal responsibility has been determined, a legal decisionmaker must choose a punishment that fits the crime. This
sentence must ordinarily be such that the combined nature and
extent of punishment is proportional to the combined
harmfulness of the offense and blameworthiness of the
offender (Farahany and Coleman Jr., 2006; LaFave, 2003).
Despite its critical utility in facilitating prosocial behavior
and maintaining social order, little is known about the origins
of, and neural mechanisms underlying, our ability to make
third-party legal decisions (Garland, 2004; Garland and
Glimcher, 2006; Zeki and Goodenough, 2004). The cognitive
ability to make social norm-related judgments likely arose from
the demands of social living faced by our hominid ancestors
(Henrich, 2003; Richerson et al., 2003). These demands may
have promoted the emergence of mechanisms for assessing
fairness in interpersonal exchanges and enacting personal
retaliations against individuals who behaved unfairly (secondparty punishment) (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a). Recent work
has greatly advanced our understanding of how the brain
evaluates fairness and makes decisions based on the
cooperative status and intentions of others during two-party
economic exchanges (de Quervain et al., 2004; Delgado et al.,
2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al.,
2003; Singer et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006; Spitzer et al., 2007).
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¶5

¶6

Notably, these studies have elucidated the neural dynamics that
underlie human altruistic punishment, in which the victim of a
social norm transgression, typically unfairness in an economic
exchange, punishes the transgressor at some significant
additional cost to himself. These findings have specifically
highlighted the importance of reward and emotion-related
processes in fueling cooperative behavior (Seymour et al.,
2007). However, how - or even whether - neural models of
economic exchange in dyadic interactions apply to impartial,
third-party legal decision-making is currently unknown (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004a). Furthermore, the importance of
uncovering neural mechanisms underlying third-party
punishment is underscored by the proposal that the
development of stable social norms in human societies
specifically required the evolution of third-party sanction
systems (Bendor and Swistak, 2001).
Given that, in great measure, criminal law strives towards
the stabilization and codification of social norms, including
moral norms, in legal rules of conduct (Robinson and Darley,
1995), moral decision-making is inherently embedded into the
legal decision-making process. The relevance of moral
decision-making to an investigation of legal reasoning is
highlighted by experimental findings which suggest that
individuals punish according to so-called “just deserts”
motives; i.e., in proportion to the moral wrongfulness of an
offender‟s actions (Alter et al., 2007; Carlsmith et al., 2002;
Darley and Pittman, 2003). As such, the seminal work of
Greene and others – which has demonstrated distinct
contributions of emotion-related and cognitive control-related
brain regions to moral decision-making (Greene et al., 2004;
Greene et al., 2001; Heekeren et al., 2005; Heekeren et al.,
2003; Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b) – is germane to the
study of legal decision-making. However, despite the
conceptual overlap between moral and legal reasoning, the
latter process is not entirely reducible to the former (Hart,
1958; Holmes Jr., 1991; Posner, 1998; Robinson, 1997;
Robinson and Darley, 1995). Indeed, whereas determining
blameworthiness may in many cases fall under the rubric of
moral decision-making, the distinctive core and distinguishing
feature of legal decision-making is the computation and
implementation of a punishment that is appropriate both to
the relative moral blameworthiness of an accused criminal
offender, and to the relative severity of that criminal offense
(Robinson, 1997; Robinson and Darley, 1995). The present
study is focused on elucidating the neural mechanisms
underlying this third-party, legal decision-making process.
In this study, we used event-related fMRI to reveal the
neural circuitry supporting third-party decision-making about
criminal responsibility and punishment. Given that these two
legally distinct judgments are rendered on the basis of differing
information and considerations (LaFave et al., 2007), we were
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A1]: In this instance, “neural mechanisms” refers to the
manner by which the brain encodes and processes information to enable a
specific cognitive ability.

Comment [A2]: There are two basic experimental designs in fMRI,
“block” and “event-related.” In block designs subjects encounter long
sequences (or “blocks”) of the same kind of stimulus (e.g., pictures of various
faces) interspersed with blocks of a control stimulus (e.g., pictures of shapes).
Average brain activity in one block is then contrasted to average brain activity
in the other block. In event-related designs, subjects encounter randomly
intermixed stimuli (e.g. faces and shapes). The choice between designs
depends on what is being investigated.
Comment [A3]: “fMRI” stand for “functional magnetic resonance
imaging.” By convention, the leading “f” is lowercase.
Comment [A4]: “Neural circuitry” refers to interconnected brain regions
that interact, like a wired circuit, during information processing. Within the
circuit, each brain region has a specialized function that contributes to the
brain‟s information-processing task.

particularly interested in determining whether these two
decision-making processes may rely on at least partly distinct
neural systems. To address this issue, we scanned 16
participants while they determined the appropriate punishment
for actions committed by the protagonist (named „John‟) in a
series of 50 written scenarios. Each of these scenarios
belonged to one of three categories: Responsibility (R),
Diminished-Responsibility (DR) and No-Crime (NC).
Scenarios in the Responsibility set (N=20) described John
intentionally committing a criminal action ranging from simple
theft to rape and murder. The Diminished-Responsibility set
(N=20) included actions of comparable gravity to those
described in the Responsibility set but also contained
mitigating circumstances that may have excused or justified the
otherwise criminal behavior of the protagonist by calling his
blameworthiness into question. The No-Crime set (N=10)
depicted John engaged in non-criminal actions that were
otherwise structured similarly to the Responsibility and
Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (scenarios available as
Supplementary Methods). Participants rated each scenario on a
scale from 0-9, according to how much punishment they
thought John deserved, with “0” indicating no punishment and
“9” indicating extreme punishment. Two groups of 50
scenarios (equated for word length between conditions and
between groups) were constructed and their presentation
counterbalanced across the 16 participants. The Responsibility
set of group 2 consisted of group 1 Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios for which the mitigating circumstances had been
removed, while the Diminished-Responsibility set of group 2
consisted of group 1 Responsibility scenarios with mitigating
circumstances added. Thus, each criminal scenario (e.g.
depicting theft, assault or murder) in the Responsibility and
Diminished-Responsibility condition was created by modifying
identical „stem‟ stories, with salient details such as magnitude of
harm matched between conditions.

Comment [A5]: What governs study size? fMRI scan sessions are
expensive, frequently extending 1.5 hours, at $300 to $600 per hour. In
determining a suitable number of subjects, statistical power (the probability
that a real experimental effect will be detected) trades against cost. As a
general rule, studies with fewer than 10 subjects are treated with skepticism.
Comment [A6]: To prevent changes in subjects‟ brain responses that are
due to variables not under the experimenter‟s control, researchers keep
variations to a minimum. Here, the protagonist‟s name is kept constant
across all scenarios, to avoid confounds that could follow if different names
were used. Again, there are trade-offs: the possible confound of using the
same name repeatedly (which risks subjects cumulating their reactions to
John‟s behavior, despite instructions not to) was considered less problematic
than that different brain activations could be caused by different subject
associations with different names.
Comment [A7]: fMRI data are extremely “noisy,” in the sense that a small
but true brain “signal” of interest that changes with the experimental
manipulation can be obscured by much larger but irrelevant brain activation
differences between experimental conditions. Since noise is random, while
the true signal is not, researchers can detect changes in true signal by
averaging the signal across all trials (enabling noise to cancel out).
Consequently, researchers aim to pack as many experimental trials as possible
(here, 50) into a given 60-90 minute scan session. Averaging across a large
number of trials increases the likelihood of detecting the experimentally
manipulated signal.
Comment [A8]: It is common to hold constant other variables in an
experiment (here, gravity/severity of the harm), to ensure that any changes in
brain activity between two conditions are due to the variable being
investigated, rather than other factors.
Comment [A9]: It is common to include control stimuli. Here, a “NoCrime” control was included to provide a baseline level of brain activity that is
associated with subjects viewing a protagonist intentionally engaged in a
relatively harmless act. Thus, the experimenter is able to disentangle brain
activity associated with viewing intentional action per se from that associated
with viewing intentional actions that are potentially criminal.
Comment [A10]: For the control condition to be maximally useful, it
must be as similar as feasible to the main conditions (in length, subject task,
and general format, for example).
Comment [A11]: Because even slight head motion interferes with
accurate data collection, scanned subjects must generally indicate responses
with their hands, by pressing buttons, moving a joystick, or rolling a trackball.
Here, each finger had a separate button. The buttons corresponded to a
relative (i.e., internal/subjective) scale of punishment, rather than to some
absolute metric, because that enabled more meaningful comparisons between
subjects (since subjects could differ widely in their personal upper limits of
actual punishment).
Comment [A12]: In general, counterbalancing helps diminish the
potential confounding effects of variables not being studied. For example,
any effect of order of presentation, when encountering multiple stimulus
types, can be neutralized or diminished by randomizing the presentation order
of stimuli. The counterbalancing in this experiment ensured that equal
numbers of participants saw each group of scenarios.
Comment [A13]: Here, the counterbalancing ensured that different brain
activity between different scenarios was likely a function of the level of
responsibility manipulated as a variable, rather than a function of some other
difference (such as location, item stolen, etc.) between the two scenarios.
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RESULTS
Behavioral Data
¶7

Behavioral data showed a significant effect of scenario
category on punishment ratings (F (1,15) = 358.61, p < 0.001)
(Figure 1), with higher mean ratings for the Responsibility
(Mean = 5.50, S.E. = 0.22) than for the DiminishedResponsibility scenarios (Mean = 1.45, S.E. = 0.21) (p < 0.001,
paired t-test), indicating that assessed punishment was strongly
modulated by the protagonist‟s criminal responsibility. By the
same token, the fact that the mean punishment rating for the
Diminished-Responsibility condition was greater than 0
suggests that some participants still attributed some
blameworthiness to the protagonist despite the extenuating
circumstances.

Comment [A14]: Behavioral data, in brain imaging contexts, are
measurements of subject responses that are separate from the collection of
brain images. Typically, these are not recorded by the MRI machine. Here, for
example, behavioral data include the punishment rating each subject selected
for each scenario, and the elapsed time between presentation of scenario and
selection of punishment.
Comment [A15]: “Significant” is an important term of art in science. In
scientific experiments, observed results can be due to three things: 1) the
factor that that the experimenter thinks the results are due to (i.e., the
experimental manipulation); 2) an unmanipulated factor that the experimenter
hasn‟t thought of or controlled (i.e., a “confound”); or 3) random chance (i.e.,
a “false positive”). A claim of significance is ordinarily accompanied by a
numerical representation (a “p” value) of the probability that the results arose
by random chance. For example: p < .05 indicates that there is less than 5
chances in 100 that the result described could have arisen by chance alone. In
setting a p-value to a given value, an investigator allows for the fact that there
is a certain set probability that any effect is due to random chance, and it is
near-universally agreed that p < 0.05 is a “reasonable” threshold. Statistical
software outputs a p-value for each experimental comparison of interest.
Thus, referring to something as “significant” in this context ordinarily means
that the experimenter has submitted an experimental measure to a statistical
test, and the outcome of this test allows the experimenter to be confident that
the results have less than a 5% probability of being due to random chance. In
some instances, a p-value may be set lower (e.g., to .01) to allow stricter
control over the possibility of obtaining a false-positive.
Comment [A16]: The significant results from the statistical tests allow the
authors to state that rating differences between conditions were due to the
experimental manipulation. Briefly, in psychology and neuroscience, an
independent variable is the factor that the experimenter manipulates to cause
some effect on the dependent variable. When we talk about an effect of
condition, we‟re talking about the effect of one or more independent variables
on one or more dependent variables. Here, the dependent variable is
punishment ratings and the independent variable is scenario category (which
has three “conditions” or “levels”): Responsibility, Diminished Responsibility,
and No-Crime.
Comment [A17]: These refer to the outcome of the statistical tests. In
this case, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was used – the “F” value
gives an indication of the strength of the experimental manipulation, and can
be understood to represent the size of the difference in scores conditions,
while the “p” value indicates that there is less than 1 chance in 1000 that these
condition differences could have arisen by chance
Comment [A18]: S.E. stands for “standard error (of the mean)” which
helps readers understand the estimated stability of the measurement across
samples. Essentially, this indicates the likelihood that the mean value will
“jump” around between different samples of subjects.
Comment [A19]: The paired t-test is a common statistical test used to test
for the effects of a condition on a dependent measure.
Comment [A20]: This means the authors‟ key experimental manipulation
(here, protagonist‟s criminal responsibility) affected how much punishment
subjects gave to the protagonist.
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To examine the subjective emotional experience elicited by
the scenarios, all participants completed post-scan ratings of
emotional arousal for each scenario. These ratings also
demonstrated an effect of condition (F (1,15) = 94.61, p <
0.001) (Figure 1), with greater mean arousal scores for the
Responsibility (Mean = 4.83, S.E. = 0.41) compared to
Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (Mean = 3.48, S.E. =
0.35)(p < 0.001, paired t-test). Additionally, we found a
significant interaction between rating type (punishment vs.
arousal) and condition (Responsibility vs. DiminishedResponsibility) (F (1,15) = 68.8, p < 0.001) such that, while the
punishment and arousal ratings were not significantly different
for the Responsibility scenarios (p > 0.05, paired t-test),
punishment ratings were significantly lower than the arousal
ratings for the Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (p < 0.001,
paired t-test) (Figure 1). Lastly, we found a main effect of
scenario condition on reaction times (RTs) (F(1,15) = 21.87, p
< 0.001), such that RTs were shortest for the No-Crime
condition and longest for the Diminished-Responsibility
condition (mean, S.E. for: Responsibility = 12.69s, 0.46;
Diminished-Responsibility = 13.76s, 0.46; No-Crime = 11.12s,
0.44) (all paired comparisons p < 0.01).
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Comment [A21]: The authors sought to quantify the subjects‟ emotional
responses to the scenarios because they hypothesized that emotional
responses could influence punishment decisions.
Comment [A22]: Subjects rated each of the 50 scenarios (presented in
random order on a computer screen outside the scanner) on the basis of how
emotionally aroused they felt following its presentation (0 = calm, 9 =
extremely excited.

Comment [A23]: “Main effect” is a term of art referring to the effect of
one experimentally manipulated factor (e.g. protagonist responsibility) on one
experimental variable (e.g. reaction time). Often, investigators are interested
in looking at the interactive effects of two or more conditions on a dependent
variable. The term “main effect” is used to indicate that the influence of one
independent variable was examined in isolation.
Comment [A24]: Reaction time is the length of time elapsing between the
“onset” (when the subject was first presented with the scenario to consider)
and the behavioral response (here, pressing a button to select a punishment
level).

fMRI Data: Criminal Responsibility
¶9

To identify brain regions that were sensitive to information
about criminal responsibility, we contrasted brain activity
between Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios. The resulting statistical parametric map (SPM)
revealed an area of activation in the right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC, Brodmann Area 46, peak at
Talaraich coordinates 39, 37, 22 [x,y,z]; Figure 2a) that was
significantly more activated in the Responsibility than in the
Diminished-Responsibility condition. Time course analyses of
peak activation differences confirmed that there was greater
rDLPFC activity in Responsibility compared to DiminishedResponsibility or No-Crime conditions (R>NR, p = 0.002;
R>NC, p = 0.0004; paired t-tests; see Figure 2b) and no
difference between the Diminished-Responsibility and NoCrime conditions (p = 0.19). No effect of condition was found
in the left DLPFC (p > 0.2 for all paired comparisons; see
Methods), and the right DLPFC was significantly more
engaged than the left DLPFC in the Responsibility condition
(p = 0.04, paired t-test), suggesting that punishment-related
prefrontal activation is confined to the right hemisphere.
Bilateral anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) demonstrated a
pattern of responsibility-related activity that was similar to
rDLPFC (Table 1, Supplementary Figure 1, Supplementary
Results), whereas the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) showed
the reverse pattern, with more activity for the DiminishedResponsibility than the Responsibility condition (Table 1,
Figure 3, see below).

Comment [A25]: All BOLD fMRI studies are based on comparisons of
BOLD signal between two conditions. By subtracting BOLD signal (within a
given brain region) during one condition from brain BOLD signal (within that
same brain region) during another condition, the effect of the experimental
manipulation on regional brain function can be estimated. Here, because the
only factor that differs between experimental conditions is information about
protagonist responsibility, this subtraction method allows fMRI investigators
to remove brain activation that is not due to the independent variable. In this
study, the authors took an average of the measured brain signal during each R
scenario, an average of the measured brain signal during each DR scenario, an
average of the measured brain signal during each NC scenario, and compared
these condition-averaged signals for each subject. They then took an average
across all subjects to see where in the brain the signal was significantly
different between levels of the independent variable.
Comment [A26]: An “area of activation” is a region of the brain where
the measured fMRI signal was significantly greater during one condition (e.g.
R) compared to another (e.g. DR).
Comment [A27]: There are several ways to designate brain regions. One
rather general way uses 45 “Brodmann‟s Areas.” These are based on a
classification scheme devised by Korbinian Brodmann (1868-1918), separating
areas by neuron type and organization.
Comment [A28]: The “peak” refers, in this instance, to the specific
region of the brain that demonstrated the strongest effect of condition.
Comment [A29]: Human brains vary widely in size and shape. Because
fMRI investigators average condition differences in brain activity across
subjects, it is imperative that a brain region on one subject correspond to the
exact same brain region on another subject. Thus, before an fMRI investigator
can compare brain activity between conditions, each subjects' brain must first
be ”normalized” into a common space. Neuroimagers therefore translate (or
“warp”) subjects‟ brains into a single, common brain space. The most
frequently used template is that defined by the coordinate system of Talairach
and Tourneaux. After warping into Talaraich space, which has a standardized
three-dimensional coordinate system based on neuroanatomical landmarks,
regional brain activation can be compared between subjects - and importantly,
across studies. So, in this section of the paper, the authors are describing
precisely where changes in brain function occurred. Roughly speaking,
rDLPFC is like designating a city, Brodmann Area 46 is the street, and
Talairach coordinate is the precise street number.
Comment [A30]: Time course analyses examine what is happening, over
time, within a given region of the brain, during the cognitive task performed.
Comment [A31]: “Peak activation” refers to the maximum amplitude of
BOLD signal (and hence, by inference, brain activity) within a given brain
region. The sentence here describes an analysis of the different times at
which, under different conditions, the maximum BOLD signal appeared
within the brain region.
Comment [A32]: In articles describing experimental results, the
experimental and analytical methods are ordinarily and carefully described in a
separate “Methods” section.
Comment [A33]: The brain contains two largely independent
hemispheres, left and right. Anatomical features (such as the amygdala)
generally appear separately in both hemispheres.
Comment [A34]: For a depiction of brain orientation, see Box 1 (next
page).
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Box 1.
(Accompanies Comment 34)

Reproduced by permission of Sinauer Associates
from Dale Purves et al., Neuroscience, 2d edition 2001.

Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
All Rights Reserved.

¶10

¶11

¶12

The greater rDLPFC activation in the Responsibility
condition did not simply result from longer time-on-task:
response times (RTs) to Responsibility scenarios were shorter
than Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (p = 0.005, paired ttest), and the effect of condition on rDLPFC activity was still
significant when response time was used as a covariate in an
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA, F(1,37) = 10.15, p = 0.003)
or when response times were equated between conditions (see
Methods; R>DR, p = 0.006; R>NC, p = 0.002; Supplementary
Figure 2). In addition, rDLPFC activity was not correlated with
reaction time (p = 0.09 in Responsibility scenarios, p = .12 in
Diminished-Responsibility scenarios). We also assessed
whether the activity pattern in rDLPFC might have been
driven by between-condition differences in emotional arousal
rather than by differences in criminal responsibility. To this
end, we performed a peak activation difference analysis
between the Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility
conditions after equating their mean arousal ratings
(Responsibility = 3.62, Diminished-Responsibility = 3.50; p >
0.10, paired t-test; see Methods). The results still revealed
greater rDLPFC activity in the Responsibility compared to the
Diminished-Responsibility condition even in the absence of
arousal differences (p = 0.0005, paired t-test).
If rDLPFC is involved in the decision-making process to
punish blameworthy behavior, then this brain region should be
more activated during Diminished-Responsibility scenarios in
which subjects still decided to punish (punishment ratings of 1
or greater) compared to Diminished-Responsibility scenarios in
which they did not (punishment rating of 0). Consistent with
this hypothesis, rDLPFC activity was higher in “punished”
Diminished-Responsibility trials than in “non-punished”
Diminished-Responsibility trials (p = 0.04, paired t-test, Fig. 2).
In turn, rDLPFC activity during “non-punished” DiminishedResponsibility trials was not greater than in No-Crime trials. (p
= 0.98, Figure 2). These results, as well as those for aIPS
(Supplementary Results, Supplementary Fig. 1), strongly
support the notion that prefrontal and parietal activity is
modulated by a punishment-related decisional process.
In addition to the peak activation differences, the
timecourse of rDLPFC activity revealed an early deactivation
(negative percent signal change from baseline) around 8 s poststimulus onset. Importantly, this early deactivation („dip‟) does
not account for the peak activation results outlined above: the
activation differences between conditions at the dip do not
predict corresponding activation differences at the peak
(correlation of subjects‟ activity differences between the
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility conditions at the
dip and at the peak: ρ = -0.19, p = 0.49; Supplementary Figure
3; see Methods). Furthermore, rDLPFC activity during „nonpunished‟ Diminished-Responsibility and No-Crime trials
strongly differed at the dip (p = 0.008) but not at the peak (p =
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A35]: “Covariate” in this instance refers to a factor other than
the independent measure that could contribute to condition differences in a
dependent measure (in this case, fMRI signal). To ensure that this
uncontrolled factor did not cause the observed condition differences in the
dependent measure, the authors performed a test (called an ANCOVA) to see
if condition differences remained even after taking that uncontrolled factor –
the covariate – into account. A significant value for this test indicates that the
covariate did not drive the observed differences in fMRI signal.
Comment [A36]: Response time differences between conditions might
influence the observed pattern of brain results in a manner that was not
anticipated or desired by the investigators. To control for this potential
confound, an ANCOVA was employed.
Comment [A37]: A “peak activation difference analysis” is simply a test
to see if the peak activation within a brain region (see comment 31) differed
significantly between two experimental conditions (here, the Responsibility
and Diminished Responsibility conditions).

Comment [A38]: “Deactivation” in this context refers to the fact that
BOLD signal in this region, at this particular moment in time, was lower (i.e.,
comparatively deactivated) after showing subjects the experimental scenarios.
Comment [A39]: s = seconds
Comment [A40]: Post-stimulus onset means after presentation of the
experimental stimulus (scenario)
Comment [A41]: That between-condition activation differences at peak
and at dip were not related to each other suggests that this region of the brain
might be involved in two distinct activities at these different points in time.

0.97), indicating that peak activation differences are not simply
carry-over effects from differences during the dip.
fMRI Data: Punishment Magnitude
¶13

¶14

¶15

The finding that rDLPFC activity was higher when
subjects decided to punish, in either Responsibility scenarios or
in “punished” Diminished-Responsibility trials, raised the
possibility that this brain region might track the amount of
assessed punishment for a given criminal scenario. However,
rDLPFC signal amplitude was not linearly correlated with
punishment ratings (ρ = -0.33, p = 0.15; Figure 2D) in the
Responsibility condition. This finding suggests that the
magnitude of punishment is not simply coded by a linear
increase in rDLPFC activity.
Although rDLPFC activity was not proportional to
punishment amount, a linear relationship between peak BOLD
amplitude and punishment magnitude was found in a set of
brain regions that have been extensively linked to social and
affective processing. To isolate such effects, we compared
Responsibility scenarios with high punishment ratings to those
with low ratings (median split by scenario across subjects; see
Methods). The resulting SPM revealed activation in the right
amygdala (peak Talairach coordinates 29, -7, -13; Fig 4;
Supplementary Figure 5) as well as in other brain regions
commonly associated with social and affective processing
(LeDoux, 2000; Phelps, 2006; Phillips et al., 2003; Price, 2005),
including the posterior cingulate, temporal pole, dorsomedial
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and inferior frontal gyrus
(Supplementary Table 2; Supplementary Figure 4,
Supplementary Figure 5). The association between amygdala
activity and punishment magnitude was further demonstrated
by a strong correlation between amygdala BOLD signal and
punishment ratings across Responsibility scenarios (ρ =.70, p =
0.001; Fig. 4). However, punishment rating was not the only
variable that correlated with amygdala function, as participants‟
arousal ratings yielded a similar correlation with amygdala
activity (ρ = 0.67, p = 0.001), and punishment and arousal
ratings were themselves highly correlated (ρ = 0.98, p =
0.000001). Correlations between peak BOLD signal and
punishment ratings (and between peak BOLD signal and
arousal ratings) also held for a number of the other affective
regions, including ventromedial prefrontal cortex and posterior
cingulate cortex (Supplementary Table 2; Supplementary
Figures 4 and 5), indicating that the relationship between
affective processing and punishment involved a distributed
neural circuit.
Although the correlation between amygdala activity and
punishment scores could be interpreted as evidence for a role
of emotional arousal in the assignment of deserved
punishment, it is also possible that such activity simply
reflected subjects‟ emotional reaction to the graphical content
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A42]: Signal amplitude here is a synonym for peak activation.
Comment [A43]: Correlation is a statistical test to see if two variables are
related. A linear correlation means that as one variable increases in value, so
does another (positive correlation). Alternatively, a negative correlation refers
to a relationship wherein as one variable increases in value, another exhibits a
commensurate decrease.
Comment [A44]: The greek letter rho refers to the value of a statistical
test for correlation (the Spearman test).
Comment [A45]: I.e., represented in the brain by.
Comment [A46]: See comment 25 for explanation of BOLD.
Comment [A47]: “Affective” is a psychological term of art, meaning
“emotional.”
Comment [A48]: A median split divides a set of experimental
observations (here, punishment ratings) into two groups split at the median,
such that the higher half of the set is in one group, and the lower half of the
set is in the other.

Comment [A49]: This correlation suggests that subjects‟ emotional
responses to a scenario correlated positively with how much punishment
subjects will assign to the protagonist in that scenario.

Comment [A50]: See comment 4 for description of neural circuits.

of the scenarios rather than its involvement in the decisionmaking process per se. To avoid the potential arousal confound
inherent to an examination of criminal scenarios that differ in
graphic content (as was the case for our comparison of high vs.
low punishment scores within the Responsibility condition),
we examined the relationship between punishment ratings and
amygdala activity after controlling for the possible
confounding effect of graphic arousal. Because Responsibility
and Diminished-Responsibility scenarios were equated for
graphic content and differed only by the presence of mitigating
circumstances (see Methods), the potentially confounding
contribution of graphic arousal to amygdala activity in the
Responsibility scenarios can be controlled for by subtracting
amygdala activity in the Diminished-Responsibility scenarios
from that in the corresponding Responsibility scenarios. If
amygdala activity appertains to punishment magnitude rather
than, or in addition to, emotional arousal related to the graphic
content of the scenarios, it should still track punishment
ratings even after subtracting out graphic content differences in
the scenarios. To this end, we created, for each pair of
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility scenarios,
punishment rating difference scores (Responsibility minus
Diminished-Responsibility) and assessed whether these scores
were correlated with the corresponding difference scores for
peak amygdala BOLD signal. That correlation was significant
(ρ = 0.62, p = 0.001; Figure 4), indicating that the magnitude
of amygdala BOLD signal difference between Responsibility
and Diminished-Responsibility conditions for a given scenario
predicted a corresponding change in punishment rating for
that scenario. Similar correlations were found in posterior
cingulate and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Supplementary
Table 2). These findings suggest that activity within brain
regions previously implicated in social and affective processing
reflect third-party decisions about how much to punish, even
after controlling for the potentially confounding arousal
associated with the “graphic” content of the criminal scenarios.
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Comment [A51]: It is incumbent on the investigator to prove that their
effects are due to their experimental manipulation, and not to other
uncontrolled factors that could explain their results just as well. Such an
uncontrolled factor that could potentially explain the results better than the
experimental manipulation is referred to as a confound.

DISCUSSION
¶16

¶17

The present findings suggest that the two fundamental
components of third-party legal decision-making - determining
responsibility and assigning an appropriate punishment
magnitude - are not supported by a single neural system. In
particular, the results reveal a key role for the right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex in third-party punishment. This brain region
appears to be involved in deciding whether or not to punish
based on an assessment of criminal responsibility. The only
other brain region demonstrating a comparable pattern of
responsibility-related activity (R>DR, R>NC, DR=NC) to
rDLPFC was the anterior intraparietal sulcus (Supplementary
Table 1, Supplementary Figure 1, Supplementary Results). This
parietal region has been associated with a number of diverse
cognitive functions including general response selection (Gobel
et al., 2004) and quantitative numerical comparisons (Dehaene
et al., 2003; Dehaene et al., 1999; Feigenson et al., 2004), which
may hint at a role for this area in associating a specific action
(punishment outcome) with a given scenario.
Our results also implicate neural substrates for social and
affective processing (including amygdala, medial prefrontal
cortex and posterior cingulate cortex) in third-party
punishment, albeit in ways distinct from the rDLPFC.
Specifically, while prefrontal activity was linked to a categorical
aspect of legal decision-making (deciding whether or not to
punish on the basis of criminal responsibility), the magnitude
of assigned punishments for criminal transgressions
parametrically modulated activity in affective brain regions,
even after controlling for the potentially confounding arousalrelated activity associated with the graphic content of the
criminal scenarios. Our findings suggest that a set of brain
regions (e.g. amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior
cingulate) consistently linked to social and emotional
processing (Adolphs, 2002; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Barrett et
al., 2007; Lieberman, 2007; Phelps, 2006; Phillips et al., 2003;
Zald, 2003) is associated with the amount of assigned
punishment during legal decision-making. As such, these
results accord well with prior work pointing to social and
emotional influences on economic decision-making and moral
reasoning (De Martino et al., 2006; Delgado et al., 2005;
Koenigs and Tranel, 2007) (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Greene et
al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Heekeren et al.,
2003; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll et al., 2002b; Moll et al., 2005),
and provide preliminary neuroscientific support for a proposed
role of emotions in legal decision-making (Arkush, 2008;
Maroney, 2006). Our data concur with behavioral studies that
have proposed a link between affect and punishment
motivation in both second- and third-party contexts, and are
consistent with the hypothesis that third-party sanctions are
fueled by negative emotions towards norm violators (Darley
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A52]: In the discussion section of scientific papers, the
investigators comment on the significance of their findings, place these
findings in the context of the current scientific literature, address possible
shortcomings or limitations of the study, and make suggestions for future
studies.

Comment [A53]: Neural substrates are brain regions that underlie a
certain kind of information processing.

Comment [A54]: In this context, “parametrically” means that as the
magnitude of punishment increases, so does brain activity in these regions.

Comment [A55]: Affect = emotion.
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and Pittman, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a, b; Seymour et
al., 2007). However, it must be acknowledged that the present
conclusions rest exclusively on correlational data. Thus,
additional research will be required to confidently determine
the contributions of socio-affective brain regions to third-party
punishment in the absence of any graphic arousal confound. In
particular, it will be important in future experiments to fully
dissociate the factors of crime severity and arousal by
employing task conditions that manipulate arousal without
affecting crime severity. Furthermore, future research should
also focus on determining how these affective brain regions
interact with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during third-party
punishment decisions.
An additional concern in interpreting our findings, or any
others based on simulated judgments, is whether they are
relevant to real-world decision-making. After all, the
punishment decisions made by our participants did not have
direct, real-world consequences for real criminal defendants.
Thus, it remains to be seen if our findings, generated by
examining brain activation patterns during "hypothetical"
judgments, will generalize to circumstances in which "real"
punishments are made. However, there is some evidence
suggesting that the hypothetical judgments made by our
subjects may be a good proxy measure for real-world legal
judgments. For example, post-scan debriefing of our subjects
indicated that their punishment assessments were implicitly
legal, with lower numbers corresponding to low prison
sentences and higher numbers corresponding to high prison
sentences (see Supplementary Table 3). Thus, participants
appeared to adopt an internal punishment scale based on
incarceration duration - a legal metric - when making their
judgments, even in the absence of explicit instructions to do
so. Further, we found that participants‟ decisions about
punishment amount for each of the crimes depicted in the
Responsibility scenarios were strongly correlated with the
recommended prison sentences for those crimes, according to
the benchmark sentencing guidelines of North Carolina, a
model state penal code (ρ = 0.8, p<.0001; Supplementary
Figure 6; see Methods). Thus, although our subjects were not
literally applying a criminal statute to an accused individual,
these data suggest that subjects' punishment decisions were
consistent with statutory legal reasoning. However, despite
these suggestions, further empirical studies are required to
confirm our supposition that neuroimaging studies of
simulated third-party legal decision-making can be valid models
for understanding the neural basis of real-world legal
reasoning.
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Comment [A56]: A common criticism of fMRI is that it is inherently
correlational. Brain activity changes are correlated with changes in the
independent variable, but one cannot say definitively that the independent
variable caused those brain activity changes. Nor can one definitively say that
the regions identified by this correlational approach are necessary or sufficient
for the kind of cognitive process under study (e.g. legal decision-making).

Relative contributions of Temporo-Parietal Junction (TPJ) and
rDPLFC to Third-Party Punishment Decisions
¶19

The neural mechanisms of third-party punishment are
undoubtedly complex, involving a dynamic regional interplay
unfolding in a temporally specific manner. In particular, the
decision to punish a person for his blameworthy act is
generally preceded by an evaluation of that person‟s intention
in committing that act (Alter et al., 2007; Carlsmith et al., 2002;
Darley and Pittman, 2003; Darley and Shultz, 1990; Robinson
and Darley, 1995; Robinson et al., 2007; Shultz et al., 1986).
Such an evaluation ought therefore to activate brain regions
that underlie the attribution of goals, desires, and beliefs to
others, referred to as theory of mind (TOM)(Gallagher and
Frith, 2003). One such region, the TPJ - a key node in the
distributed TOM network (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Gallagher
and Frith, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Vollm et al., 2006)
- might be predicted to serve this function during legal
decision-making given recent evidence of its role in attributing
mental beliefs in moral judgments (Young et al., 2007) and its
involvement in dyadic economic exchange games (Rilling et al.,
2004). Given this context, it is noteworthy that the TPJ was
activated in all of our conditions (Fig. 3). Furthermore, TPJ
came online during the period when rDLPFC was deactivated
(see Fig 2B), a result that is consistent with the suggestion that
temporo-parietal cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
operate within largely distinct and at times functionally
opposed networks (Fox et al., 2005). Given this proposed
antagonistic response pattern in the TPJ and DLPFC, we
speculate that the early rDLPFC deactivation may reflect a
perspective-taking based evaluation of the beliefs and
intentions of the scenarios‟ protagonist, which is followed by a
robust rDLPFC activation as subjects go on to make a decision
to punish based on assessed responsibility and
blameworthiness. However, the conclusion that rDLPFC‟s
biphasic timecourse reflects an initial socio-evaluative process
followed by a decisional process must be viewed as tentative
because the present experiment did not constrain the temporal
sequences of evaluative and decisional processes involved in
this task.
Moral versus Legal Decision-Making

¶20

The results of the present neuroimaging study underscore
the conceptual relationship between moral and legal decisionmaking. Indeed, the general involvement of both the prefrontal
cortex and affective brain regions in legal reasoning is
reminiscent of their roles in moral judgment (Greene et al.,
2004; Greene et al., 2001). Specifically, moral decision-making
studies have indicated that regions of lateral prefrontal cortex
and inferior parietal lobe may be preferentially involved in
impersonal moral judgments whereas socio-affective areas (e.g.
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A57]: “Temporally specific,” in this context, refers to the fact
that legal decision-making likely relies on different brain regions
communicating in specific ways at very specific times throughout the legal
decision-making process.

Comment [A58]: “Node,” in this context, refers to one specific brain
region that participates as part of a neural circuit. In general, a circuit refers to
two or more brain regions that interact cooperatively to enable some kind of
cognitive function.

Comment [A59]: Functional opposition means that as brain activity in
one network increases, brain activity in another tends to decrease.
Comment [A60]: In the present study, TPJ is shown to be activated
during a period when rDLPFC is deactivated, suggesting that they oppose
each other. This opposition is referred to as “antagonistic.”

Comment [A61]: Biphasic in this context refers to the fact that the early
(deactivation) and late (activation) periods of the rDLPFC timecourse appear
to be associated with different cognitive functions.
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amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate
cortex) may be primarily engaged during personal moral
decision-making (Greene et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001).
Thus, both legal and moral decision-making may rely on „cold‟
deliberate computations supported by the prefrontal cortex
and „hot‟ emotional processes represented in socio-affective
brain networks, although the extent to which these two
decision-making processes rely on the same brain circuitry
remains to be determined.
While these findings serve to highlight an important
conceptual overlap between moral reasoning and legal
reasoning in criminal contexts, they do not imply that thirdparty punishment decisions are reducible to moral judgment.
Indeed, while legal decision-making may in most (but not all)
criminal cases have an essential moral component, there are
crucial distinctions between morality and law (Hart, 1958;
Holmes Jr., 1991; Posner, 1998). Perhaps the most critical
distinguishing feature of legal decision-making, compared to
moral decision-making, is the action of punishment - intrinsic
to the former and secondary to the latter (Robinson, 1997).
Although our participants likely engaged in the process of
evaluating the moral blameworthiness of the scenarios‟
protagonist, our study was designed to investigate the neural
substrates of a fundamental legal decision - assigning
punishment for a crime - that is not a defining characteristic of
moral judgment. Indeed, while moral decision-making studies
to date have focused on assessing brain function during
decisions about the moral rightness or wrongness of actions
depicted in written scenarios, they have not specifically
addressed the issue of punishment (Borg et al., 2006; Greene et
al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Heekeren et al., 2005; Heekeren
et al., 2003; Kedia et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2006; Moll et al.,
2002a; Moll et al., 2002b; Moll et al., 2001; Young et al., 2007;
Young and Saxe, 2008).
Neural convergence of second-party and third-party punishment
systems.

¶22

The prefrontal cortex area activated in the present thirdparty legal decision-making study corresponds well to an area
that is involved in the implementation of norm enforcement
behavior in two-party economic exchanges (peak Talairach
coordinates of 39, 37, 22 [x,y,z] for (Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey
et al., 2003); vs 39, 38, 18 [x,y,z] for the present study), raising
the possibility that rDLPFC serves a function common to both
third-party legal and second-party economic decision-making.
In this respect, it is noteworthy that this region of rDLPFC is
recruited when participants decide whether or not to punish a
partner by rejecting an unfair economic deal proposed by that
partner (Sanfey et al., 2003); this result is analogous to our
finding that rDLPFC is activated by the decision to punish the
perpetrator of a criminal act. Furthermore, while disruptive
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A62]: Neural convergence is when a common brain region
underlies two distinct, but related, cognitive processes.
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magnetic stimulation of this region impairs the ability to punish
economic norm violations in dyadic exchanges (Knoch et al.,
2006; van 't Wout et al., 2005), this manipulation has no effect
on norm enforcement behavior when the unfair economic
exchanges are randomly generated by a computer instead of a
human agent (Knoch et al., 2006). This result accords well with
our finding that rDLPFC was much less activated when the
scenario protagonist was not criminally responsible for his
behavior, and supports the notion that this prefrontal cortex
area is primarily recruited when punishment can be assigned to
a responsible agent (Knoch et al., 2006). Finally, we still
observed greater rDLPFC activity in the Responsibility
condition (compared to Diminished-Responsibility scenarios)
when we restricted our analysis to scenarios that only
contained physical harms (p < 0.005, paired t-test), suggesting
that the overlap of rDLPFC activity between studies of
economic decision-making and the present examination of
legal decision-making is not solely driven by scenarios
describing economic transgressions.
The parallels between these previous findings and our
current results lead us to suggest that the right DLPFC is
strongly activated by the decision to punish norm violations
based on an evaluation of the blameworthiness of the
transgressor. This proposed function of rDLPFC appears to
apply equally to situations where the motive for punishment is
unfair behavior in a dyadic economic exchange or when
responding to the violation of an institutionalized social norm
in a disinterested third-party context. Of course, confirmation
of this hypothesis will require further experimental evidence
that legal and economic decision-making (and perhaps moral
decision-making as well) rely on the same neural substrates.
That said, this apparent overlap illustrates an important point:
that the brain regions identified in our study are not specifically
devoted to legal decision-making. Rather, a more parsimonious
explanation is that third-party punishment decisions draw on
elementary and domain-general computations supported by the
rDLPFC. In particular, on the basis of the convergence
between neural circuitry mediating second-party norm
enforcement and impartial third-party punishment, we
conjecture that our modern legal system may have evolved by
building on pre-existing cognitive mechanisms that support
fairness-related behaviors in dyadic interactions. Though
speculative and subject to experimental confirmation, this
hypothesis is nevertheless consistent with the relatively recent
development of state-administered law enforcement
institutions, compared to the much longer existence of human
cooperation (Richerson et al., 2003); for thousands of years
before the advent of state-implemented norm compliance,
humans relied on personal sanctions to enforce social norms
(Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr and Gachter, 2002).
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Comment [A63]: Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) is a
non-invasive technique that disrupts brain activity. In rTMS, a series of
magnetic pulses are applied to a circumscribed region of the brain. These
pulses temporarily interfere with brain activity in that region, creating a
reversible “virtual lesion.”

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
¶24

Sixteen right-handed individuals (8 males, age 18-42) with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated for financial
compensation. The Vanderbilt University Institutional Review
Board approved the experimental protocol, and informed
consent was obtained from each subject after they were briefed
on the nature and possible consequences of the study. A brief
psychological survey was also administered to exclude
individuals who may react adversely to the content of the
criminal scenarios. Exclusion criteria included history of
psychiatric illness, being the victim of or having witnessed a
violent crime (including sexual abuse), and having experienced
any trauma involving injury or threat of injury to the subject or
a close friend/family member.
Paradigm

¶25

¶26

In this experiment, subjects participated in a simulated
third-party legal decision-making task in which they
determined the appropriate level of punishment for the actions
of a fictional protagonist described in short written scenarios.
The principal goal of our study was to isolate the neural
processes associated with the two fundamental processes of
legal decision-making: deciding whether or not an accused
individual is culpable for a given criminal act, and determining
the appropriate punishment for that act (a parametric process
based on the ordinal severity of a crime). Correspondingly, our
design manipulated responsibility in a dichotomous fashion
and crime severity in a continuous fashion. Each participant
viewed 50 scenarios (some inspired by prior behavioral studies
of relative blameworthiness (Robinson and Darley, 1995;
Robinson and Kurzban, 2007)) depicting the actions of the
protagonist named “John.” The 50 scenarios were subdivided
into three sets (complete scenario list available as
Supplementary Methods). In the Responsibility set (N = 20),
the scenarios described John intentionally committing a
criminal action ranging from simple theft to rape and murder.
The Diminished-Responsibility set (N = 20) included similar
actions comparable in gravity to those in the Responsibility set,
but contained circumstances that would often legally excuse or
justify the otherwise criminal behavior of the protagonist. The
No-Crime set (n=10) depicted John engaged in non-criminal
actions that were otherwise structured similarly to the
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility scenarios. The
No-Crime scenarios were included to assist in interpreting
activity differences between Responsibility and DiminishedResponsibility scenarios (see e.g. Fig. 2).
Two groups of 50 scenarios were constructed and their
presentation counterbalanced across the 16 participants (8
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A64]: Because handedness can affect which side of the brain
is used to process some kinds of information, group-averaged brain scan
studies typically use subjects of one handedness or the other.
Comment [A65]: The Institutional Review Board (IRB) is charged with
approving, monitoring, and reviewing human subjects research to make sure
that subjects‟ rights are respected, and that research conforms with established
ethical standards.
Comment [A66]: An experimental protocol is the specific “recipe” for
executing a study. It details the process for recruiting subjects and running
the experiment.
Comment [A67]: Subjects must provide “informed consent” to
participate – that is, they must be fully informed about what to expect in an
experiment, and what their rights are as a subject, before they are allowed to
agree to participate.
Comment [A68]: Exclusion criteria are established reasons to exclude a
subject from participating in the study.

Comment [A69]: That is, the protagonist‟s responsibility was either full
or diminished (dichotomous), but he was described committing a range of
crimes ranging in severity from simple theft to rape and murder (continuous).
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subjects received group 1 scenarios, and 8 others received
group 2 scenarios) and across gender (equal numbers of men
and women received scenarios from each group). The
Responsibility set of group 2 consisted of group 1 DiminishedResponsibility scenarios from which the mitigating
circumstances had been excised, while the DiminishedResponsibility set of group 2 consisted of group 1
Responsibility scenarios with mitigating circumstances added.
As a result, the Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios were counterbalanced across subjects, and differed
only by the presence of mitigating circumstances. Thus, exactly
the same scenario premises were used in constructing the
Responsibility and Non-Responsibility conditions. Finally, the
No-Crime set was identical in both groups of scenarios, and all
scenario sets were equated for word length.
Participants rated each scenario on a scale from 0-9,
according to how much punishment they thought John
deserved, with “0” indicating no punishment and “9”
indicating extreme punishment. Punishment was defined for
participants as “deserved penalty.” Participants were asked to
consider each scenario (and thus, each “John”) independently
of the others and were encouraged to use the full scale (0-9)
for their ratings. In the scanner but prior to the functional
scans, subjects were shown five practice scenarios that were
designed to span the punishment scale. Scenarios
were
presented as white text (Times New Roman) on a black
background (14.2 degrees [width] x 9.9 [height] degrees of
visual angle). Below each scenario an instruction reminded
participants of the task instructions: “How much punishment
do you think John deserves, on a scale from 0 to 9 where 0 =
No punishment and 9 = Extreme punishment. By punishment,
we mean deserved penalty.” Participants were instructed to
make a response as soon as they had reached their decision.
Each trial began with the presentation of a scenario, which
remained onscreen until participants made a button press
response, or up to a maximum of 30 seconds. Participants then
viewed a small white fixation square (0.25 degrees of visual
angle) for 12-14 seconds (as stimulus onset was synched to
scan acquisition [TR = 2s], while stimulus offset was synched
to subject response), which was followed by a larger fixation
square (0.49 degrees of visual angle) for two seconds prior to
the presentation of the next scenario. Ten scenarios (four
Responsibility, four Diminished-Responsibility, and two NoCrime) – selected randomly without replacement from the fifty
scenarios – were presented in each of the five fMRI runs.
Scenario identity and condition order were randomized for
each run. The duration of each fMRI run was variable, with a
maximum length of 7.33 minutes. The experiment was
programmed in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick MA) using the
Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997)
and was presented using a Pentium IV PC.
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A70]: Two sets of complementary scenarios were constructed
so that no individual subject viewed the same core scenario details (e.g.,
unlawfully taking a book) twice – once as a responsibility scenario and then
again as a diminished responsibility scenario. This arrangement would increase
the likelihood that subjects would consciously detect our experimental
manipulation. If subjects become conscious of an experimental manipulation,
they tend to behave differently – an experimental artifact referred to as
“demand characteristics.”
Comment [A71]: Word length is a potential confound. If the subject
reacts differently to two scenarios that not only have different content but
also different length, then the differences in brain function might be caused
by differences in reading time, instead of content.

Comment [A72]: Functional scans refer to MRI scans that detect brain
activity over time. In contrast, anatomical scans detect brain structure in detail,
but without assessing brain function.

Comment [A73]: It is good practice in fMRI studies to give participants
something to focus on in between trials in order to limit mind-wandering.

Comment [A74]: Researchers commonly want to avoid “order effects” –
a confound whereby the order in which a condition type is presented (e.g.
mostly R first or mostly NR first) creates response biases. It is also important
to avoid “run effects” – a confound whereby certain trial types predominate in
one run and are absent in another. To avoid both, we randomized trial types
both within and between runs.
Comment [A75]: For a depiction of the differences between sessions,
runs, volumes, slices, and voxels, see Box 2 (next page)

Box 2.
(Accompanies Comment 75)

Reproduced by permission of Sinauer Associates
from Scott A. Huettel et al., 2003.
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Following the scanning session, participants rated the same
scenarios along scales of emotional arousal and valence. They
first rated each of the 50 scenarios (presented in random order
on a computer screen outside the scanner) on the basis of how
emotionally aroused they felt following its presentation (0 =
calm, 9 = extremely excited). They then rated each of the
scenarios, presented again in random order, on the basis of
how positive or negative they felt following its presentation (0
= extremely positive, 9 = extremely negative). In these
sessions, subjects rated the same scenarios they viewed in the
scanner. The valence data were highly correlated with arousal
ratings, and multiple regression analysis demonstrated that they
did not account for any additional variance in punishment
ratings that is unaccounted for by the arousal data. Therefore,
the valence data are not further discussed in this manuscript.

Comment [A76]: Emotional arousal measures how emotionally excited a
subject feels. Emotional valence describes the direction (positive or negative) of
that arousal.

Comment [A77]: Multiple regression analyses are standard statistical
processes for disentangling the multiple influences of multiple variables.
More specifically, they examine independent and interactive influences of
multiple independent variables on a given dependent variable. (See comments 16
and 35.)

Internal scale questionnaire
¶30

In a post-scan debriefing, participants were questioned
about the internal scale of punishment they used during the
scan. Specifically, participants were asked “what kind of
punishment did you imagine?” for punishment scores of 1, 3,
5, 8 and 9. There was strong agreement among participants
about their internal scale of justice. While low punishment
scores (1, 3) were generally associated with financial or social
penalties, greater punishment scores (5, 8) included
incarceration time, with higher scores associated with longer
jail times and, at the extreme (9), life imprisonment or state
execution.
Relationship between Punishment Ratings and Legal Statutes

¶31

¶32

To investigate the relationship between punishment ratings
for Responsibility scenarios obtained in the present experiment
and an existing, statutorily prescribed punishment for each of
the crimes depicted in these scenarios, we coded each
Responsibility scenario using the criminal law and criminal
procedure statutes of the state of North Carolina. Among
those states that have a sentencing statute, North Carolina‟s is
widely considered to be both comprehensive and
exemplary(Stanley, 1996; Wright, 2002).
For each responsibility scenario, we determined the
crime(s) (such as larceny, involuntary manslaughter, or murder)
with which John might reasonably be charged under the
criminal code of North Carolina (2005 General Statutes of
North Carolina, Chapter 14). We then determined, for each
crime, the authorized presumptive sentencing range (such as 58
to 73 months in prison), assuming no aggravating or mitigating
factors that could, under the statute, increase or decrease the
authorized sentencing range (2005 General Statutes of North
Carolina, Chapter 15A, Article 81). We then calculated and
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A78]: Debriefing is often an important feature of scientific
studies involving human subjects, as it can help researchers understand the
extent to which subjects‟ motivations and observed behavior matched the
experimenter‟s expectations. In this case, the authors wanted to gauge
precisely what subjects intended for a given punishment value, given that the
scale (0-9) was by design subjective rather than objective and absolute.

assigned to each scenario the mean for this range, in months.
As the distribution of sentence values was highly right-skewed,
we log-transformed (natural log) to create a normal distribution
of sentence values (we verified that non-transformed data
produced similar correlations as transformed data). For
scenarios with multiple crimes, the averages for each respective
crime were summed (whether this summed value or simply the
mean value for the most severe crime depicted in a given
scenario was used in the correlation analysis did not
significantly affect the results). Where the upper limit of the
sentencing range was life in prison, it was coded as 29 years
(which has been estimated as the average time likely to be
served by lifers newly admitted in 1997)(Mauer et al., 2004).
Similarly, where the upper limit of the sentencing range was
death, it was also quantified as life in prison (29 years). The
log-transformed mean sentences for each of the 20 scenarios
were then correlated with the group-averaged punishment
ratings for these scenarios.

Comment [A79]: To work properly, some statistical tests require that the
data have certain features (e.g., a so-called “normal distribution” of values).
The authors applied a standard mathematical transformation to the sentence
scores to permit the use of these statistical tests.

Statistical Analysis
¶33

Mean punishment and arousal scores and reaction times
were calculated for each subject for each condition
(Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility, and No-Crime)
and entered into a repeated-measures Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) using SPSS 15 (SPSS Inc. Chicago, IL) to determine
main effects and interactions. Data from 16 subjects were used
for all analyses. Punishment, arousal scores and reaction times
were compared between conditions and post-hoc tests were
performed using Fisher‟s Least Significant Difference (LSD)
measure using an alpha level of .05. Two-tailed tests were used
in all cases. For correlational analyses, data from Responsibility
scenarios (N = 20) were averaged across all (N = 16) subjects.
Examination of scatterplots for the correlation of rDLPFC
signal and punishment suggested the presence of outliers. As
non-parametric correlations tend to be more robust to outliers,
we used Spearman‟s ρ to measure correlations between fMRI
signal, behavioral measures, and recommended sentences. All
correlations that were significant using Spearman‟s ρ were also
significant (p < 0.05) when we employed Pearson‟s r.
fMRI Data Acquisition

¶34

High resolution 2D and 3D anatomical images were
acquired with conventional parameters on a 3T Philips Achieva
scanner at the Vanderbilt University Institute of Imaging
Science. The visual display was presented on an LCD panel
and back-projected onto a screen positioned at the front of the
magnet bore. Subjects lay supine in the scanner and viewed the
display on a mirror positioned above them. Stimulus
presentation was synchronized to fMRI volume acquisition.
Manual responses were recorded using two five-button
keypads (one for each hand; Rowland Institute of Science,
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A80]: The alpha level defines an acceptable rate of “Type-I”
error (the false positive rate). More specifically “.05” means, here, that the
authors accept as significant only the statistical comparisons that they are
confident have less than a 5% false positive rate.
Comment [A81]: This “Statistical Analysis” section details how the data
were prepared before testing for relationships between fMRI signal,
behavioral measures, and recommended sentence values. Such testing was
accomplished via correlation analysis. (See comments 43 and 56.)
Comment [A82]: This section details the precise statistical test – a
Spearman correlation, signified by the greek letter rho – used to examine
relationships between fMRI signal, behavioral measures, and recommended
sentence values. It also gives a rationale for using this test, as opposed to
other common tests of correlation (like Pearson‟s).
Comment [A83]: Pearson‟s test – which uses the letter “r” to denote the
value of its statistic – is another way to test for relationships between
variables. It is more vulnerable to extreme values than the Spearman test.
Comment [A84]: This section of the paper describes the specific
parameters that determine the characteristics of the signal that will be acquired
from the brain using the fMRI scanner. Those parameters include such details
as the number, thickness, and orientation of the brain slices from which this
signal will be acquired.
Comment [A85]: 3D (three-dimensional). This refers to an image of
brain structure, also known as T1-weighted.
Comment [A86]: Magnet strength is measured in units of Tesla (T), after
Nicola Tesla (a prolific inventor and electrical engineer). For comparison, the
Earth‟s magnetic field strength is around one twenty-thousandth of one Tesla.
Comment [A87]: Manual responses are typically recorded because
speaking often moves the head (and hence brain) in subtle ways, interfering
with the fMRI signal. Additionally, MRI scanners are very loud, making it
impractical to record speech.
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Cambridge MA). Functional (T2* weighted) images were
acquired using a gradient-echo echoplanar imaging (EPI) pulse
sequence with the following parameters: TR 2000 ms, TE 25
ms, flip angle 70°, FOV 220x220mm, 128x128 matrix with 34
axial slices (3 mm, 0.3 mm gap) oriented parallel to the gyrus
rectus. These image parameters produced good T2* signal
across the brain except in ventromedial frontal cortex, where
some signal dropout was evident in all subjects (Brodmann
area 11).
Each of the 16 participants performed five fMRI runs,
except for two participants who could only complete four runs
due to technical malfunctions.

Comment [A88]: T2* (pronounced “tee-two-star”) is a biophysical
parameter. It describes an atomic phenomenon that is strongly influenced by
the local physiological conditions within a small area of brain tissue. It is
affected by the local magnetic environment. Changes in T2* between
conditions allow the experimenter to contrast brain activity between
conditions. With fMRI, what is really being measured is the biophysical
phenomenon known as T2* relaxation. That is, fMRI detects differences in
T2* relaxation between oxygenated blood (decreases T2*, increases fMRI
signal) and deoxygenated blood (increases T2*, decreases fMRI signal).
Comment [A89]: A gradient echo pulse sequence describes the sequence
of changes in the three smaller magnetic fields within the fMRI scanner.
These smaller magnetic fields are used to create differences in magnetic field
strength (gradients) between one end of the scanner and the other. These
gradients are used in localizing brain activity. EPI is a customizable recipe that
specifies the precise radiofrequency pulses to be used during the scan. It
allows for the rapid collection of fMRI images.
Comment [A90]: The parameters detailed here are basically standard.
These are values that the experimenter feeds to the MRI machine to tell it
how the brain images are to be collected. For example, 34 axial slices, 3mm
thick: this tells the scanner how the investigator wants to cut up the brain specifically, into 3mm slices, oriented in a particular plane, 34 slices of which
together comprise an entire brain image volume. The 0.33 mm gap defines the
distance that separates slices, so they do not overlap. TR: specifies how long
it takes the scanner to acquire an entire volume of 34 slices. TR is important
because it defines the lower end of the temporal resolution of scans. For
example, if it takes 2s to acquire one volume, the experimenter can‟t claim to
detect changes that occur at a rate that is faster than 2s.
Comment [A91]: This informs the reader about how the slices were
oriented, using a known structural brain feature (the gyrus rectus) as a
reference.
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fMRI Data Preprocessing
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Image analysis was performed using Brain Voyager QX 1.4
(Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands) with custom
Matlab software (MathWorks, Natick MA).
Prior to random effects analysis, images were preprocessed
using 3D motion correction, slice timing correction, linear
trend removal and spatial smoothing with a 6mm Gaussian
kernel (full width at half maximum). Subjects‟ functional data
were coregistered with their T1-weighted anatomical volumes
and transformed into standardized Talairach space.

Comment [A92]: fMRI data are not immediately ready for analysis after
being obtained from the scanner. Several image processing steps, known as
“preprocessing,” are required to make the images suitable for analysis
(processing). This section describes those steps.

Comment [A93]: Random effects analyses allow for the generalization of
results from one specific sample (e.g. the 16 subjects scanned in this study) to
the population at large.
Comment [A94]: fMRI images are acquired in sequence over the course
of many minutes, during which subjects often make slight head movements.
These cause sequential images to become unaligned, with respect to the
position of the head. Motion correction therefore reorients the images to
account for slight head movements.
Comment [A95]: A single brain image (known as a “volume”) is
comprised of many sequentially obtained thin “slices” that are acquired over
the course of anywhere from a few hundred milliseconds to several seconds (2
seconds in this study). While these slices are linked together and treated as
though they were acquired at the same time, slight differences can exist
between the slices due to minute differences in acquisition time. The slice time
correction step “corrects” for these differences by slightly “blurring” the slices
in a given volume over the total acquisition time.
Comment [A96]: fMRI signal changes that are unrelated to the
experimental task can occur across the scan session. As one example, one
scenario could trigger an emotionally arousing memory, which in turn elicits
brain activity that is irrelevant to the task. These changes can obscure taskrelated signal, limiting the ability of the experimenter to detect an effect.
Linear trend removal “removes” some of these task-independent signal
changes.
Comment [A97]: To take into account anatomical differences between
subjects that still remain after warping to a common space (see comment 29)
each brain image volume is slightly blurred, a process known as smoothing.
This prevents brain differences that are not meaningful from being interpreted
as if they are.
Comment [A98]: This is a description of the degree of smoothing applied
to the images. For fMRI, this typically ranges from 0-8 mm.
Comment [A99]: In a typical fMRI scan session, two types of images are
acquired. “Structural” images provide a high resolution picture of brain
anatomy, but give no information about brain activation over time.
“Functional” images (also referred to as “T2*” or “epi” images due to
technical details of how these images are acquired) provide a very good
picture of changes in brain activation over time, but give very poor
information about brain anatomy. Coregistration describes a process whereby a
subject's functional and structural images are aligned or “registered” together.
This aids the process of spatial normalization to a common space.
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Responsibility Analysis
¶38

This analysis was performed to isolate brain regions that
were sensitive to responsibility during punishment assessment.
Signal values for each fMRI run were transformed into Zscores representing a change from the signal mean for that run
and corrected for serial autocorrelations. Design matrices for
each run were constructed by convolving a model
hemodynamic response function (double gamma, consisting of
a positive γ function and a small, negative γ function reflecting
the
BOLD
undershoot
–
SPM2,
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) with regressors specifying
volumes acquired during the entire trial (stimulus onset to
stimulus offset) for a given condition. These were entered into
a general linear model with separate regressors created for each
condition per subject (random effects analysis). We then
contrasted the beta-weights of regressors using a t-test between
conditions to create a statistical parametric map (SPM)
showing voxels that demonstrated significantly increased
activation in the Responsibility condition compared to the
Diminished-Responsibility condition. Predictors for the NoCrime condition were weighted with a zero (i.e. not explicitly
modeled). We applied a False-Discovery Rate (FDR) threshold
of q < .05 (with (c(V) = ln(V) + E)) to correct for multiple
comparisons. Only activations surviving this corrected
threshold are reported.

Comment [A100]: The material in this paragraph describes how the
investigators compared brain imaging volumes between the experimental
conditions to create a statistical map of fMRI signal differences.

Comment [A101]: In this context, each scenario for which subjects
determine punishment is one experimental “trial.” 10 trials comprised one
fMRI “run” of approximately 7 minutes. 5 runs (50 trials) comprised one
complete experiment.

Comment [A102]: “Statistical parametric map” (SPM) is the more precise
term for a brain image in fMRI. “Pictures” of brain images, resulting from
fMRI studies, are not akin to direct, photographic snapshots of brain activity.
They are instead generated by a computer, using parameters defined by the
experimenters to perform statistical comparisons of measured fMRI signal
between experimental conditions. These statistical comparisons are performed
in every single “voxel” in the brain. A “voxel” (a contraction of “volume
element”) is the smallest unit of resolvable measurement of fMRI signal.
Voxel size is determined by the investigator and programmed into the fMRI
scanner at the start of each experiment. In the current study, voxels were
3mm (on a side) cubes - a typical size for fMRI studies. Thus, investigators
divide their subjects‟ brains into tens of thousands of these voxels for the
purposes of localizing changes in brain activity between conditions. This
means that for each subject, tens of thousands of statistical comparisons were
performed – one statistical test for each of these 3mm cubes. The colors in a
“brain image” represent the value of the statistical test in each voxel, with
brighter colors usually meaning higher statistical values, and thus a greater
difference in brain activity between two conditions. Our brain map is thus
really a statistical map or – more accurately – a statistical parameter map. In
this case, the parameter referred to is a t-statistic, as the investigators are using
t-tests to compare activity between conditions.
Comment [A103]: As stated above (see comment 102) investigators
perform tens of thousands of statistical tests. As voxel sizes are quite small,
the brain is thus divided into many many voxels. Say, for example, that a brain
is divided into 60,000 such voxels: that means that 60,000 separate statistical
tests will be performed. If an investigator sets the maximum probability of
false positives error to 5%, and 5% of 60,000 is 3000, with 60,000 statistical
tests, and a p-value of p < 0.05, that means that an investigator could
potentially have an “activation” of 3000 voxels due to chance alone. 3000
voxels, at a voxel size of 3mm, is very large, meaning that “activation” in an
entire brain region could be a false positive. This problem is referred to as the
“multiple comparisons” or “multiple testing” problem, and statistical
corrections have been devised to account for this issue. The “False Discovery
Rate” (FDR) approach is one such correction, and has been implemented in
the current study.
Comment [A104]: Surviving a corrected threshold, in this context, means
meeting the criteria for rejecting the null hypothesis – i.e., that there are no
between-condition differences in brain activation within a given region – even
after invoking the correction for multiple comparisons described above
(comment 103).
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Volumes of interest (VOIs) were created from the
suprathreshold clusters isolated in the above SPM at the
conservative FDR threshold. The boundary of these VOIs
were drawn from SPMs thresholded using a less conservative
implementation of FDR (q < .05, c(V) = 1). The signal for
each trial (event) included the time course from two TRs (four
seconds) before stimulus onset to 13 TRs (26 seconds) after.
Each event‟s signal was transformed to a percent-signal change
(PSC) relative to the average of the first three TRs (0-4 seconds
before stimulus onset). Event-related averages (ERAs) were
created by averaging these PSC-adjusted event signals; separate
ERAs were created for each combination of VOI, condition,
and subject. These ERAs were then averaged across subjects
for display purposes.
As subjects were instructed to make a response as soon as
they had reached a decision about punishment amount, and in
keeping with other neuroimaging studies of decision-making
(Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Coricelli et al., 2005; Dux et al.,
2006; Ivanoff et al., 2008; Rahm et al., 2006), decision-related
activity should correspond to the portion of the time course
that follows subjects‟ response. Given that mean RTs hovered
around 12 seconds (mean, S.E. for: Responsibility = 12.69s,
0.46; Diminished-Responsibility = 13.76s, 0.46; No-Crime =
11.12s, 0.44) and accounting for a hemodynamic peak rise
time of about 5 seconds post-stimulus (Boynton et al., 1996;
Friston et al., 1994; Heeger and Ress, 2002), then peri-decision
activity should occur approximately 17 seconds after trial
onset, which corresponds well with the time of peak
hemodynamic response observed in rDLPFC (see Fig. 2). We
therefore used the peak hemodynamic response as a measure
of decision-related activity. To determine condition effects on
BOLD signal within a given brain region, we then contrasted
each condition‟s activation averaged across subjects by using
paired t-tests applied on these peak estimates. The peak was
experimentally defined as the single volume with maximal
signal change from baseline between volumes 1 and 13 (2-26
seconds post stimulus onset). However, we ascertained that the
same results were obtained when the peak was defined using a
narrower volume range of 14 to 22 seconds post-stimulus
(R>DR, p = 0.00070; R>NC, p = 0.00025, DR>NC, p =
0.19), or even when using a single volume 16s post-stimulus
(R>DR, p = 0.00023; R>NC, p = 0.00027, DR>NC, p =
0.84). Thus, our rDLPFC peak activation results are insensitive
to the temporal width of the analysis window.
Arousal- and Reaction-Time Equated Analyses

¶41

To determine whether activation differences between the
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility conditions were
driven by punishment assessment rather than any differences
in arousal, these two conditions were compared after equating
for arousal ratings. This was accomplished by deleting the six
trials with the highest arousal ratings from the Responsibility
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A105]: In this context, VOI (volume of interest) and ROI
(region of interest) both refer to regions of the brain within a statistical
parametric map that the experimenters have selected for further, more
detailed analysis.
Comment [A106]: “Clusters” are contiguous activated voxels.
Suprathreshold clusters are clusters that survive a given corrected threshold
(see comment 104).
Comment [A107]: This sentence describes the fact that the investigators
have selected as VOIs, clusters that survive a certain kind of correction for
multiple comparisons.
Comment [A108]: This is a method for quantifying the magnitude of
experimentally-induced BOLD signal increase. It is the percentage of change
in BOLD signal, between the two experimental conditions, to which
researchers attend.
Comment [A109]: BOLD signal changes during each trial are averaged
across each trial type (e.g., here, in Responsibility trials) for each
suprathreshold cluster for each subject. These per-subject averages are then
averaged across subjects.

Comment [A110]: There is a lag between changes in brain activity and
changes in BOLD signal. BOLD signal (see comments 25 and 31) takes about
4-6 seconds to reach its maximum following brain activity.
Comment [A111]: Brain activity that occurs around the time a
punishment decision is made.

Comment [A112]: This describes how the investigators defined the
BOLD signal peak – the precise time of the maximum increase in BOLD
signal from baseline.

¶42

condition for each subject. Time courses were extracted and
peak differences were compared as above.
We also determined whether reaction time differences
between the Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility and
No-Crime conditions affected the brain activation results by
comparing these conditions after equating for response times.
This was accomplished by deleting, for each subject, the trials
with the highest reaction times for Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios and the trials with the lowest reaction times for the
No-Crime scenarios until the RTs across conditions (for each
subject) were approximately equal (p > 0.1 for all paired t-tests
between conditions). In addition, we compared rDLPFC
activation between Responsibility and DiminishedResponsibility scenarios controlling for reaction time by
performing a GLM analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) using
the extracted rDLPFC BOLD signal and punishment reaction
times for each Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility
scenario averaged across subjects.

Comment [A113]: This term of art refers to the process of “extracting”
the underlying statistical information from brain images. This is often useful
for performing more in depth statistical analyses.

Dissociation of activation peak and deactivation dip
¶43

To assess the relationship between early (~8s) deactivation
in the rDLPFC timecourse and later (~16s) peak activation, we
calculated peak and “dip” values for the Responsibility and
Diminished-Responsibility conditions from each subject‟s
ERA. “Peak” and “dip” were defined, respectively, as the
volume with the maximal positive and maximal negative
change from baseline. For each subject, we subtracted the
Diminished-Responsibility peak value from the Responsibility
peak value, and the Diminished-Responsibility dip value from
the Responsibility dip value. Per-subject peak and dip
difference values were then correlated via Spearman bivariate
correlation in SPSS 15.
Laterality Analyses

¶44

To confirm the lateral specificity of Responsibility-related
activation in right DLPFC, we extracted BOLD signal from
the corresponding left DLPFC volume of interest (i.e. „xmirrored‟ VOI, centered on talairach coordinate -39, 37, 22).
We performed a two-way ANOVA with “Condition”
(Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility and No-Crime) and
“Side” (Left and Right) as independent variables and BOLD
signal as the dependent variable. Post-hoc comparisons
between conditions in each hemisphere, and between
hemispheres for the Responsibility condition, were performed
using paired t-tests.
Punishment Rating Analysis

¶45

To identify brain regions that tracked the degree of
punishment subjects assigned to a scenario, we performed a
median split for punishment scores given during Responsibility
scenarios. Based on the median punishment value for each
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.
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Comment [A114]: SPSS is a widely used software application for
performing statistical comparisons.

Comment [A115]: The same brain region as identified on the right,
except on the left side (mirrored on the x-axis in the Talairach coordinate
system, which separates left from right).
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scenario in the Responsibility condition across subjects,
scenarios were separated into two groups, high and low.
Design matrices and GLMs were constructed as above, with
predictors for high and low scores for each subject specifying
volumes acquired during Responsibility trials on which a high
or low punishment score was given, respectively. We
contrasted the beta-weights of these predictors using a t-test
between high and low punishments to create an SPM showing
voxels that demonstrated significantly increased activation
during Responsibility trials in which subjects gave high (at or
above the median) punishments compared to Responsibility
trials in which subjects gave low (below the median)
punishments. We applied a threshold of q < 0.05 FalseDiscovery Rate (FDR) to correct for multiple comparisons.
Using a conservative implementation of the FDR correction
technique (c(V) = ln(V) + E), we did not find significant
activation differences. We report activations significant at FDR
q < 0.05, using a less conservative implementation of FDR
(c(V) = 1). The differences between the two implementations
relate to assumptions about the independence of tests being
performed on the data; both are valid for controlling multiple
testing in functional imaging data(Genovese et al., 2002).
VOIs were created as described for the Responsibility
analysis. The extracted peak activation values were used for a
correlation analysis between punishment rating and BOLD
response. Specifically, for each of the 20 Responsibility
scenarios, the peak amplitude of the group-averaged ERA was
computed, and the resulting value was correlated with the
corresponding group-averaged punishment rating for that
scenario. These peak values were also used in the betweencondition difference score analyses.
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FIGURES

Figure 1. Punishment and arousal ratings for each scenario type.
While punishment and arousal scores were similar in the Responsibility condition, punishment
scores were significantly lower than arousal scores in the Diminished-Responsibility condition.
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Figure 2. Relationship between responsibility assessment and right DLPFC activity.
A) SPM displaying the right DLPFC VOI (rendered on a single subject T1-weighted image),
based on the contrast of BOLD activity in the Responsibility condition compared to the DiminishedResponsibility condition, t(15) > 3.5, q < 0.05, random effects analysis. R = Right Hemisphere. B)
BOLD activity time courses in right DLPFC for the Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility and
No-Crime conditions. BOLD peak amplitude was significantly greater in the Responsibility condition
compared to both the Diminished-Responsibility and No-Crime conditions (p = 0.002, p =.0004,
respectively). Peak was defined as the single TR with maximal signal change from baseline within the
first 13 volumes after scenario presentation onset. t-tests were performed on these peak volumes,
which were defined separately for each condition and each subject. C) BOLD activity time courses in
right DLPFC for Responsibility, “non-punished” Diminished-Responsibility (DiminishedResponsibility 0), “punished” Responsibility (Diminished-Responsibility 1-9) and No-Crime
scenarios. BOLD peak amplitude was significantly greater in “punished” compared to “nonpunished” Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (p = 0.04), while no difference was observed
between “non-punished” Diminished-Responsibility and No-Crime scenarios (p = 0.98). D)
Relationship between BOLD peak amplitude in right DLPFC and punishment ratings in the
Responsibility condition. These two variables were not significantly correlated (p > 0.15).
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Figure 3. Relationship between responsibility assessment and bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) activity.
A) SPM displaying the right and left TPJ VOIs (rendered on a single subject T1-weighted image),
based on the contrast of BOLD activity in the Diminished-Responsibility condition compared to the
Responsibility condition, t(15) > 3.5, q < 0.05; random effects analysis. R = Right Hemisphere.
BOLD activity time courses in right (B) and left (C) TPJ for the Responsibility, DiminishedResponsibility and No-Crime conditions. BOLD peak amplitude was significantly greater in the
Diminished-Responsibility condition compared to the Responsibility and conditions for right (p =
0.0005) and left (p = 0.001) TPJ. Peak was defined as the single TR with maximal signal change from
baseline within the first 13 volumes after scenario presentation onset. t-tests were performed on these
peak volumes, which were defined separately for each condition and each subject.
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Figure 4. Relationship between punishment and right amygdala activity.
A) SPM displaying the right amygdala VOI (rendered on a single-subject T1-weighted image),
based on the contrast of BOLD activity between high and low punishment (computed from the
median split for Responsibility scenarios), thresholded at t(15) > 4.1, p < 0.001 (uncorrected) for
visualization. This amygdala activation survives correction for multiple comparisons, q(FDR) < 0.05;
random-effects analysis. R = Right Hemisphere.
B) Relationship between BOLD peak amplitude in the right amygdala and punishment ratings in
the Responsibility condition. These two variables were significantly positively correlated (p = 0.001).
C) Relationship between condition differences in right amygdala BOLD peak amplitude
(Responsibility minus Diminished-Responsibility) and condition differences in punishment score
(Responsibility minus Diminished-Responsibility); these two variables are significantly correlated (p
= 0.001).
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SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
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Supplementary Figure 2.
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